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HOW MUCH DO WE REALLY KNOW 
ABOUT CRIMINAL DETERRENCE? 
RAYMOND PATERNOSTER*
This Article discusses the deterrence of crime through sanctions.  It 
begins with a brief intellectual history of deterrence theory in the work of 
Cesare Beccaria and Jeremy Bentham, two Enlightenment philosophers 
who created the conceptual foundation for later deterrence and rational 
choice theory.  Although a prominent intellectual current by the end of the 
1700s, interest in deterrence and rational choice based theories of criminal 
offending was later eclipsed by more biologically and psychologically 
based explanations.  Interest in deterrence theory and the deterrent effect of 
legal sanctions was not rekindled until the mid-1960s.  This Article 
discusses the particular and important role of the Journal of Criminal Law 
and Criminology in publishing the works of both those who were highly 
critical of deterrence theory and those who wished to keep it alive, though 
vividly aware of the lack of any empirical support for it.  This Article 
discusses the theoretical connections that are presumed by the deterrence 
process and briefly reviews some important empirical studies pertaining to 
each of those presumed causal connections.  The empirical evidence leads 
to the conclusion that there is a marginal deterrent effect for legal 
sanctions, but this conclusion must be swallowed with a hefty dose of 
caution and skepticism; it is very difficult to state with any precision how 
strong a deterrent effect the criminal justice system provides.  At the very 
least, there is a great asymmetry between what is expected of the legal 
system through deterrence and what the system delivers.  There is greater 
confidence that non-legal factors are more effective in securing compliance 
than legal threats.  It is argued that the empirical evidence does support the 
belief that criminal offenders are rational actors, in that they are 
responsive to the incentives and disincentives associated with their actions, 
but that the criminal justice system, because of its delayed imposition of 
punishment, is not well constructed to exploit this rationality. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The concept of deterrence is quite simple—it is the omission of a 
criminal act because of the fear of sanctions or punishment.  While not the 
entire premise, deterrence is certainly an important foundation of the 
criminal justice system.  Law enforcement exists both to apprehend 
wrongdoers and to convince would-be wrongdoers that there is a risk of 
apprehension and punishment if they commit a crime.  Laws that provide a 
host of different sanctions for the commission of criminal offenses (fines, 
probation, imprisonment) serve notice that criminal statutes contain a 
credible threat that—it is hoped—will inhibit those who have been 
punished from committing additional crimes (specific deterrence) and those 
who have not yet offended from committing crimes at all (general 
deterrence).  Particular criminal justice policies such as police 
“crackdowns,” enhanced enforcement in and surveillance of high crime 
areas or “hot spots,” mandatory minimum sentences, sentencing 
enhancements for firearm possession, “three-strike” laws, and others are all 
enacted with the expectation that they will successfully engineer the crime 
rate down through deterring offenders and would-be offenders.  It is 
reasonable to argue that a belief or expectation that sanction threats can 
deter crime is at the very heart of the criminal justice system. 
In spite of its central importance, and the very high expectation we 
have that legal punishment and criminal justice policies can inhibit crime, 
we do not have very solid and credible empirical evidence that deterrence 
through the imposition of criminal sanctions works very well.  While we 
have an abundance of research about specific police, judicial, and 
correctional policies, as well as more general theoretical work about 
deterrence mechanisms, the evidence to date, while suggesting that there is 
a deterrence return to all that we do about crime, is more than a little flimsy.  
In essence, while we can say that there likely is a deterrent effect to the 
workings of the criminal justice system,1
 
1 It is easy enough to see that criminal deterrence frequently and effectively influences 
our actions.  We all “throw out the anchor” on the highway when we spot a patrol car.  We 
generally do not park in handicapped-only parking spots.  We do not light up a joint at the 
movies.  Burglars like to break into unoccupied homes.  Drug deals are typically made in the 
shadows and not out in the open where police can see.  But while we know that deterrence 
works in the absence of doing nothing about crime, we are decidedly less certain about 
relative or marginal deterrent effects.  For example, does increasing the number of police 
officers reduce crime?  Does adding three years to a prison sentence for the use of a gun 
deter firearm-related felonies?  Does an increased use of incarceration deter crime better 
compared with previous levels of incarceration? 
 it is difficult to determine how 
strong an effect it is and why that effect is not stronger than we might think 
it should be.  This Article explores at least two very important reasons why 
the empirical evidence in support of criminal deterrence is so weak: (1) it is 
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very difficult to isolate and measure a deterrent effect precisely because a 
great many things must happen before deterrence can occur; (2) it just may 
be very difficult to generate strong deterrent effects through the legal 
system because the system is unable to exploit human rationality 
effectively.  This Article examines selective features of the empirical 
deterrence terrain (more comprehensive reviews of the literature are both 
abundant and recent) with the intention of providing a glimpse of what we 
know about criminal deterrence and how our knowledge is very imprecise, 
how difficult it is to come by that knowledge, and what features of the legal 
system and its delivery of sanctions, and of people may contribute to our 
lack of precise knowledge about deterrence. 
The Article begins with a brief intellectual history of deterrence and 
the role of the Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology in that history.  
The following section discusses the causal mechanisms that define how the 
process of deterrence works.  This causal process links the workings of the 
criminal justice system (the objective properties of punishment) to the 
perceptual properties of punishment held by individuals to crime and, in 
turn, both of these properties of punishment to crime.  A causal effect of 
deterrence requires that each of the three links in this chain be present.  
Subsequent sections briefly review selected empirical studies about each 
one of the necessary causal connections in deterrence.  The Article 
concludes with a more speculative discussion about what it is about the 
criminal justice system and about human beings that contributes to the 
generally weak, generally imprecise empirical support for criminal 
deterrence through legal sanctions. 
II. A BRIEF INTELLECTUAL HISTORY OF DETERRENCE  
THEORY IN CRIMINOLOGY 
A. INTELLECTUAL ROOTS 
There are two standard, but nonetheless productive, sources to consult 
for an understanding of the intellectual history of deterrence theory.  The 
first is an essay, On Crimes and Punishments (On Crimes), written in 1764 
by the Enlightenment philosopher Cesare Beccaria,2 and the second is 
Jeremy Bentham’s An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and 
Legislation (Introduction to the Principles), published in 1789.3
 
2 CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS (Henry Paolucci trans., Macmillan 
1986) (1764). 
  Although 
Beccaria is often cited as the founder of the classical school of criminology, 
3 JEREMY BENTHAM, THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION (Prometheus Books 
1988) (1789). 
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On Crimes does not really contain a fully developed theory of crime as 
much as Bentham’s does.  Beccaria’s On Crimes is best thought of as a 
collection of principles that an enlightened ruler might use to make the 
administration of his legal system more systematically rational and 
therefore, Beccaria would argue, efficient.4  Nevertheless, the essay does 
contain discussions about the characteristics of punishment that form the 
foundation of deterrence theory.5  Bentham’s Introduction to the Principles 
contains a more fully articulated theory of crime that provides a better 
foundation for a rational choice theory of crime.6 
On Crimes begins by clearly describing Beccaria’s purpose—not to 
question authority, but to make the exercise of authority more rational: 
Whoever might wish to honor me with his criticism should therefore begin by 
understanding clearly the design of this work, a design which, far from diminishing 
legitimate authority, must serve to increase it, if reasoning rather than force can 
prevail among men, and if benevolence and humanity justify it in the eyes of all.7 
Becarria was an Enlightenment thinker who was repulsed by the cruelty and 
barbarism of the legal codes under the anciens regimes throughout Europe.8  
These codes allowed such practices as secret accusations, torture, 
convictions without trial, and a host of not only cruel but disparate 
punishments.9  These practices were offensive to Beccaria because their 
irrationality made them ineffective for crime control.10  What Beccaria 
proposed in their place was a corpus of principles for authorities to follow 
that would make their rule more rational and, therefore, more effective.11  
He proposed a system of legal reforms that included clearly written laws, a 
restrained judiciary, the abolishment of torture and secret accusations, and a 
proportionality between the harm produced by the crime and the amount of 
punishment visited upon the offender.12 
Becarria argued that the motivation to commit crime was found in 
ubiquitous self-interest, which he referred to as “the despotic spirit[] which 
is in every man,”13 and that the “tangible motives”14 to commit crime had to 
be countered by punishments.  But the power of the sovereign is not 
 
4 See BECCARIA, supra note 2. 
5 Id. at 10-13. 
6 BENTHAM, supra note 3. 
7 BECCARIA, supra note 2, at 4. 
8 Id. at 3-4. 
9 See id. at 17-20, 25-28. 
10 Id. at 8-9. 
11 Id. at 17-19. 
12 Id. at 93-99. 
13 Id. at 12 (emphasis added). 
14 Id. 
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limitless; instead, the authority of the sovereign is premised on the consent 
of the governed—the social contract in Enlightenment terms—wherein each 
person surrenders only a limited part of his or her freedom in exchange for 
protection against others who would harm him or her.15  In Chapter 23 of 
On Crimes, Beccaria argued that punishment must be proportionate to the 
crime: crimes that cause the greatest damage to society should be punished 
the most severely, and the least serious crimes should result in the least 
painful punishments.16
Even before this, however, Beccaria presented (in Chapter 20) a 
proposition that has been axiomatic in deterrence theory ever since.  Certain 
punishment is a much more effective deterrent than severe punishment:  
   
One of the greatest curbs on crimes is not the cruelty of punishments, but their 
infallibility . . . .  The certainty of a punishment, even if it be moderate, will always 
make a stronger impression than the fear of another which is more terrible but 
combined with the hope of impunity; even the least evils, when they are certain, 
always terrify men’s minds . . . .17
He argued that punishments that are certain, severe enough to 
sufficiently offset the anticipated gains of crime, and arrive immediately 
after the crime would make for a more effective legal system than the 
system that existed at the time, which combined great cruelty and the 
seemingly random exercise of mercy.
 
18  Very much the original deterrence 
theorist, Beccaria’s position was that the self-interest to commit crime has 
to be thwarted by legal punishment that is certain, proportional, and swift.19
In the penultimate chapter of On Crimes, Beccaria made an interesting 
observation that is returned to at the end of this Article.  Chapter 41 is 
entitled “How to Prevent Crimes,” and Beccaria began this chapter with the 




15 Id. at 12-13. 
  Of 
course, the reader could not be blamed for thinking that after forty chapters 
he had already fully explained how crimes can be prevented—crime can be 
deterred by the threats provided by a rational and efficient legal system of 
punishment, the structure of which makes up the first forty chapters of On 
Crimes.  While Beccaria believed, without a doubt, that clearly defined laws 
that enjoy a great deal of consensus, are enforced equally, and are 
associated with certain and measured punishment could secure compliance, 
he also seemed keenly aware of the limitations of the legal system in the 
16 Id. at 62-64. 
17 Id. at 58. 
18 Id. at 58-59. 
19 Id. at 46-47, 55-57, 62-64. 
20 Id. at 93. 
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prevention of most crime.21  He argued that “the surest but most difficult 
way to prevent crimes is by perfecting education,” by which he meant 
moral education or self-restraint—education on virtue.22  Education allows 
individuals to avoid evil by enabling them to make better choices rather 
than securing their compliance through punishment, “which obtains only 
simulated and momentary obedience.”23  In terms of creating the conditions 
for maximum freedom and minimum evil (by both crime and punishment), 
Beccaria, in the end, seemed to appeal more to Rousseau’s Emile24 than to 
Bentham’s Panopticon.25
While On Crimes provides the enlightened authority with practical 
policies to make legal systems more rational and efficient, it is thin with 
respect to any developed theory of crime or criminal conduct.  Beccaria 
provided no real theory of behavior other than that crime is driven by self-
interest, which resides in everyone.  Bentham, however, offered a more 
developed intellectual source for deterrence theory’s model of human 
conduct.  It is in Bentham where one finds the notion of utility as the 
weighted balance between two opposing considerations—pleasure 
(benefits) and pain (costs)—that is the guide to conduct.
  
26  In the very first 
paragraph of Introduction to the Principles, Bentham argued that human 
behavior is directed by the twin goals of the attainment of pleasure and the 
avoidance of pain: “Nature has placed mankind under the governance of 
two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure.  It is for them alone to point out 
what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do.”27  The 
“masters” of pleasure and pain operate through the principle of utility—
actions that bring pleasure provide utility, and those that bring pain provide 
disutility.  The happiness of the individual is maximized when the sum total 
of their actions brings them more utility than disutility, and the self-
interested individual is presumed to behave in such a way as to maximize 
his individual utility.28
Sum up all the values of all the pleasures on the one side, and those of all the pains on 
the other.  The balance, if it be on the side of pleasure, will give the good tendency of 
  In talking about the general inclination to action in 
later chapters of Introduction to the Principles, Bentham stated in 
Chapter 3:  
 
21 Id. at 93-99. 
22 Id. at 98. 
23 Id. at 99. 
24 JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, EMILE: OR ON EDUCATION (Dartmouth Coll. Press 2010) 
(1762). 
25 JEREMY BENTHAM, PANOPTICON (1787). 
26 BENTHAM, supra note 3, at 1. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. at 31. 
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the act upon the whole, with respect to the interests of that individual person; if on the 
side of pain, the bad tendency of it upon the whole.29
In Chapter 7, he explained that “[t]he general tendency of an act is 
more or less pernicious, according to the sum total of its consequences: that 
is, according to the difference between the sum of such as are good, and the 
sum of such as are evil.”
 
30
In subsequent chapters, Bentham discussed the characteristics of 
pleasure and pain and, in the process, developed a theory much broader in 
scope than a strict version of deterrence theory
  Utility for individuals, then, is the net difference 
between the benefits and costs of actions; among alternative courses of 
action, the individual will choose that which has the greater sum of benefits 
over costs. 
31—a theory that resembles 
what a century later would be called rational choice theory in 
criminology.32  He stated in Chapter 3 that there are four general sources of 
pleasure and pain: (1) physical, (2) political, (3) moral or popular, and (4) 
religious.33
As one can see, in discussing this very diverse variety of pleasures and 
pains that ultimately determine the utility of one’s actions, Bentham 
developed a substantially more general theory of behavior in Introduction 
to the Principles than Beccaria did in On Crimes.  In addition to the pains 
presented by legal punishments, Bentham’s theory includes a host of 
informal sanctions, imposed by the self and social others, in addition to a 
wide consideration of the specific pleasures that can be experienced by 
criminal behavior not under the direct control of legal authorities.
  With respect to crime, an example of physical pleasure would 
be the feeling of exhilaration or “high” one gets from using drugs; an 
example of physical pain would be getting shot by a homeowner when 
trying to break into her house at night.  Political pain would include the 
stock of legal sanctions used by authorities.  Examples of the moral or 
popular pleasure and pain of criminal conduct include, respectively, the 
sense of prestige and reputation that one might get from some as a result of 
being involved in crime and the blast of censure and approbation received 
from more conventional others.  Religious pleasure consists of the sense of 
a rewarded afterlife for good conduct, and the pain consists of the 
anticipation of damnation. 
34
 
29 Id. (emphasis omitted). 
  In 
addition to the different types or sources of pain and pleasure, Bentham 
30 Id. at 70. 
31 See generally id. at 97-130. 
32 See generally THE REASONING CRIMINAL: RATIONAL CHOICE PERSPECTIVES ON 
OFFENDING (Derek B. Cornish & Ronald V. Clarke eds., 1986).  
33 BENTHAM, supra note 3, at 25. 
34 See id. at 24-42. 
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argued that there is an important variation in several characteristics—or 
their elements or dimensions—including intensity, duration, certainty, 
propinquity, fecundity, and purity.35  Later, in Chapter 5 of Introduction to 
the Principles, Bentham provided a comprehensive list of the specific kinds 
of pleasures (the pleasures of the senses, a good reputation, wealth) and 
pains (physical pains, being poor, having an ill reputation).36  At the end of 
Chapter 5, Bentham remarked, with respect to crime specifically, that the 
inclination to offend consists of a desire to attain the above pleasures and 
avoid the pains and that the punishment of the offender is inflicted, and is 
justified in being inflicted, by imposing one or more of the pains.37  Finally, 
while it is clear that he had no well-developed understanding of 
psychology, in Chapter 6 Bentham implied that the pleasures and pains that 
are the important determinants of utility, and therefore behavior, are those 
that are seen by the individual and not necessarily those that objectively 
exist: “[p]ain and pleasure are produced in men’s minds by the action of 
certain causes.  But the quantity of pleasure and pain runs not uniformly in 
proportion to the cause; in other words, to the quantity of force exerted by 
such cause.”38
In spite of what (for the times) was a fairly well-developed theory that 
explained the cause of crime, what the reaction or response to crime should 
be, and how those reactions or responses should be apportioned, when the 
profession of criminology initially developed, it did not build its foundation 
upon the works of either Beccaria or Bentham, but on the 
biological/psychological model of psychiatrists like Pinel, Pritchard, and 
Rush, who all believed that criminal behavior was more likely to be the 
result of a pathological mind than anything else and that such a pathology 
affected only a minority of persons.
 
39  From an early emphasis on 
criminality due to individual conditions, such as moral insanity, it was but a 
short-step to criminal anthropologists’ concepts of atavism, degeneration, 
and feeble-mindedness.40  This movement of the study of crime from the 
more philosophical works of Beccaria and Bentham to biological positivism 
was due to several sources including the growing influence of natural 
science (Darwin’s On the Origin of Species was published in 185941
 
35 Id. at 29-32. 
), the 
prestige of the medical profession, and the political advantages of a view of 
36 Id. at 33-42. 
37 Id. at 41. 
38 Id. at 43 (emphasis added). 
39 NICOLE RAFTER, THE CRIMINAL BRAIN: UNDERSTANDING BIOLOGICAL THEORIES OF 
CRIME 19-21 (2008). 
40 Id. at 65-70. 
41 CHARLES DARWIN, ON THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES (Penguin 2003) (1859). 
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crime that attributed its causes to individual pathology rather than some 
defect of the political or social system.42
B. RESURRECTION OF DETERRENCE THEORY 
  Whatever the appeal of the 
biological positivists, criminology would turn its back for nearly two 
centuries on deterrence theory, as well as the more general idea that the 
motivation to commit crime was something that everyone possessed and 
that crime, like any other human activity, was rational and motivated by 
considerations of utility. 
Over the years, the Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 
(Journal) has played a prominent role in both helping to bury deterrence 
theory and later reviving it.  The general ill-repute in which deterrence 
theory was held in the field of criminology before the mid-twentieth century 
was nicely captured in an article by Hans von Hentig that appeared in the 
Journal in 1938.43  Von Hentig, a former associate editor of the Journal, 
argued that there are large groups of persons who are simply immune to the 
deterrence-like threats of the law including those motivated by love or 
maternal instincts, the young and women who tend to be impetuous, those 
motivated by ideology, the “have-nots,” and the feeble-minded.44  
According to von Hentig, Bentham’s belief that persons are moved by the 
consequences of their actions, the pursuit of pleasure and avoidance of pain, 
“appear[s] to be unreal and simple-minded, when we think of the enormous 
multiformity and complication of life.”45  To von Hentig, as to most 
criminologists at the time and even later, something so complicated and 
serious as crime requires an equally complicated and serious answer.46
 
42 IAN TAYLOR, PAUL WALTON & JOCK YOUNG, THE NEW CRIMINOLOGY: FOR A SOCIAL 
THEORY OF DEVIANCE 38-40 (1973). 
  
These criminologists believed that, in order to deal with crime on the policy 
level, one must first take a comprehensive study of the individual offender 
to discover what factors or forces are operating to produce him.  Only 
through the scientific study of the individual offender can we develop a 
sense of the complex causal factors in crime, which is necessary before we 
can begin to deal with them.  In making a more general criticism of 
deterrence theory, von Hentig made a very insightful point that is returned 
to in the conclusion of this Article.  According to von Hentig, deterrence is 
doomed to fail because the pleasure of committing a criminal act is a “near 
object” while the cost provided by the legal system is a “long-distance 
43 Hans von Hentig, The Limits of Deterrence, 29 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
555 (1938). 
44 Id. at 557-60. 
45 Id. at 560. 
46 Id. at 561. 
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danger,” very much in the remote future and therefore unable to offset the 
more immediate advantages of crime.47
Two other articles in the Journal made arguments conceptually similar 
to von Hentig’s that were in opposition to the use of punishment to deter 
wrongdoing and secure compliance with rules.  In his article entitled “Is 
Punishment Necessary?,” Jackson Toby took a position that was 
characteristic of many criminologists and sociologists of his time.
 
48  
According to Toby, the use of punishment to create conformity through 
deterrence is not necessary because “[t]he socialization process prevents 
most deviant behavior. . . [and] [o]nly the unsocialized (and therefore 
amoral) individual fits the model of classical criminology and is deterred 
from expressing deviant impulses by a nice calculation of pleasures and 
punishments.”49  While punishment in the Durkheimian sense of 
strengthening the moral convictions of citizens is necessary, punishment in 
order to deter cannot hold much promise.50  Much the same position was 
taken from a psychological perspective just one year later by James B. 
Appel and Neil J. Peterson.51  They argued that psychological learning 
principles are inconsistent with the idea that punishment could inhibit 
behavior under normal circumstances.52  To be effective, they argued, 
deterrence requires either extreme (and likely cruel) forms of punishment or 
repeated applications of punishment.53  In the full spirit of the reigning 
rehabilitative model of the time, Appel and Peterson concluded that 
punishment is “essentially an ineffective way to control or to eliminate the 
behavior of the punished person.”54
Although adherents were certainly in the minority, not all scholars 
were dismissive of deterrence theory.  In fact, three articles published in the 
Journal were instrumental in keeping the deterrence doctrine intellectually 
alive until it could be fully revived in the late 1960s.  The first of these was 
by Johannes Andenaes.  The Journal published his ultimately influential 
article in 1952, almost two decades after von Hentig’s and in the midst of 
the popularity of the medical model of deviance and the rehabilitation 
 
 
47 Id. at 559 (emphasis omitted). 
48 Jackson Toby, Is Punishment Necessary?, 55 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 
332 (1964). 
49 Id. at 333 (citing ÉMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY 89 (1947)). 
50 Id. at 333-34. 
51 James B. Appel & Neil J. Peterson, What’s Wrong with Punishment?, 56 J. CRIM. L., 
CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 450 (1965). 
52 Id. at 452-53. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. at 453. 
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model of corrections.55  In his article, Andenaes argued for what he called 
the “general preventive effect of punishment.”56  The general preventive 
effect of punishment includes general deterrence but is much broader than 
that, also including the moralizing effect that punishment may have and its 
effect in creating a habit of conformity.57  Andenaes’s perspective was 
distinctive, however, in its stance against the prevailing popular and 
scientific winds as embodied in the assertion that punishment could play an 
important role in securing compliance.58  He acknowledged that the 
consideration of the general preventive effects of punishment had, over the 
years, taken a back seat to the individual preventive effects.59  The 
individual preventive effects of punishment include rehabilitation or 
reformation of the offender as well as incapacitation and specific 
deterrence.60
These views on the relationship between general prevention and the magnitude of 
punishment are built upon abstract reasoning . . . .  It must be admitted at once that 
only very little support for the proposition is to be educed from experience—in the 
first place because the general-preventive effect is always hard to ascertain, and 
second because there has never been a systematic gathering of material which could 
illuminate the question.
  Andenaes also asserted that at least one of the reasons why 
punishment for general preventive effects was not more popular within the 
scientific and policy communities was because there was not a sound 
empirical basis for the proposition that punishment had general deterrent, 
moralizing, or habituating effects:  
61
At the conclusion of his article, Andenaes simply noted that “the 
empirical data are still lacking . . . [and] we shall not have firm ground to 
stand on before a systematic investigation is made into the effect of penal 
law and its enforcement on the citizen’s behavior.”
  
62
To get a sense of the resistance to Andenaes’s efforts to bring forward 
a discussion of the role of punishment in deterrence in the existing 
intellectual current of the time, the American Catholic Sociological Review 
published a review of his article wherein the reviewer noted that 
Andenaes’s “approach, which talks of eliminating crime by means of more 
effective law enforcement and heavier penalties, is at first repugnant to the 
 
 
55 Johs Andenaes, General Prevention—Illusion or Reality?, 43 J. CRIM. L., 
CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 176 (1952). 
56 Id. at 177. 
57 Id. at 179. 
58 Id. at 179-180. 
59 Id. at 175. 
60 Id. at 180. 
61 Id. at 193. 
62 Id. at 197. 
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democratic citizen and smacks of the police state.”63  The reviewer 
acknowledged that Andenaes may have had a point about the moralizing 
effects of punishment, but that “the empirical data on crime prevention are 
still lacking.”64
The review of Andenaes’s article was followed just two years later by 
an article by John Ball in the Journal entitled “The Deterrence Concept in 
Criminology and Law.”
   
65  Ball too was clearly aware of the fact that most 
criminologists thought that punishment is archaic and barbaric, that crime is 
really due to some underlying individual pathology, and that the only way 
to reduce it is through the rehabilitation of individual offenders.66  As a 
result of this concern with reformation, most scholars either ignored 
deterrence theory or “incorrectly and prematurely dismissed [it] as 
invalid.”67  Ball’s point, much like Andenaes’s, was that rather than dismiss 
deterrence on ideological grounds, there needed to be empirical research 
conducted so that a scientific evaluation of the theory could be 
undertaken.68  Ball went much farther than simply lamenting the absence of 
an existing empirical foundation for deterrence theory; he articulated a 
comprehensive research agenda.  Two very critical points in that agenda 
were that it is very likely that any empirical deterrent effect for punishment 
(1) depends upon the certainty of punishment, and (2) requires an 
understanding of would-be offenders’ perceptions of punishment rather 
than the objective properties of punishment.69  As Ball wrote, “A law can 
have no deterrent influence upon a potential criminal if he is unaware of its 
existence.”70
In 1965, the Journal published the third important article pertaining to 
deterrence theory; C. Ray Jeffery, who was at the time the Editor of the 
Journal’s Book Review section, penned the article.
  These two points would play an important role in the 
subsequent development of deterrence theory. 
71
 
63 Joseph G. Green, Jr., Periodical Review, 14 AM. CATHOLIC SOC. REV. 57, 57 (1953). 
(reviewing Andenaes, supra note 
  Entitled “Criminal 
55). 
64 Id. 
65 John C. Ball, The Deterrence Concept in Criminology and Law, 46 J. CRIM. L., 
CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 347 (1955). 
66 Id. at 347-48. 
67 Id. at 348. 
68 See Andenaes, supra note 55. 
69 Ball, supra note 65, at 351. 
70 Id. 
71 C. R. Jeffery, Criminal Behavior and Learning Theory, 56 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY 
& POLICE SCI. 294, 294 (1965).  A paper by Schmideberg published in the Journal five years 
before Jeffery’s also presented a staunch defense for the use of punishment for deterrent 
purposes.  Melitta Schmideberg, The Offender’s Attitude Toward Punishment, 51 J. CRIM. L., 
CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 328 (1960). 
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Behavior and Learning Theory,” the article’s primary focus was the 
author’s interest in crafting a learning theory of criminal behavior that drew 
upon the work of Edwin Sutherland and B. F. Skinner.72  Since punishment 
is an integral part of operant learning theory, Jeffery spent some time 
discussing its role in criminal behavior.73  He argued that the experimental 
evidence that was accumulating in psychology supported the position that 
punishment (or at least its certainty) can play a constructive role in deterring 
criminal behavior.74  There are, however, three features about legal 
punishment that prevent it from being an even more effective deterrent: 
(1) legal punishments are generally very uncertain, (2) they are only 
imposed long after the crime has been committed and so have low celerity, 
and (3) the pleasures of crime are immediate and so carry greater weight 
than the delayed costs of crime in the would-be offender’s calculus.75  In a 
point that is returned to at the end of this Article, Jeffery noted that an 
unfortunate feature of punishment and criminal behavior is that “[t]here are 
no aversive stimuli in the environment at that moment.”76
C. MODERN REVIVAL OF DETERRENCE THEORY 
 
Although the classical school’s advocacy of deterrence theory had 
come dangerously close to being scientifically discredited and the best that 
one could say of it was that it was politely ignored by both academics and 
penal reformers, it continued to have its group of supporters.  Influential 
articles published in the Journal and a few other social scientific journals 
and law reviews kept the belief in the deterrent effect of punishment alive, 
if only on life-support.77  Rejection of the deterrence doctrine seemed to be 
based more upon ideological than empirical grounds as both friend and foe 
of deterrence noted that the empirical base was exceedingly thin.78
In spite of the neglect and criticism heaped upon deterrence theory by 
generations of criminologists and other scholars interested in crime, two 
articles appeared in 1968 that revived interest in deterrence theory—one by 
   
 
72 Jeffery, supra note 71, at 294. 
73 Id. at 294-295. 
74 Id. at 299. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. (emphasis added). 
77 See generally Daniel S. Nagin, Criminal Deterrence Research at the Outset of the 
Twenty-First Century, in 23 CRIME & JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 1 (Michael Tonry 
ed., 1998); Raymond Paternoster, The Deterrent Effect of the Perceived Certainty and 
Severity of Punishment: A Review of the Evidence and Issues, 4 JUST. Q. 173 (1987).  
78 There was, however, excellent empirical research on the deterrent effect of capital 
punishment on homicide rates.  See THORSTEN SELLIN, THE DEATH PENALTY (1959).  Even 
those who argued that capital punishment was not an effective deterrent acknowledged that 
this does not necessarily mean that other types of punishment are not capable of deterring. 
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an economist and one by a sociologist.  The article by economist Gary 
Becker was premised on an understanding of crime that was similar to 
Bentham’s,79 while sociologist Jack P. Gibbs’s article drew more from 
Beccaria.80  Both articles ignited great interest in empirically testing some 
of the hypotheses of deterrence theory.  After Gibbs’s and Becker’s articles, 
there were scores of empirical studies of the effect of sanctions and sanction 
threats, and that scholarly effort continues to the present day.81
Becker made an explicit point of rejecting existing theories of crime 
that presumed that offenders possess some sort of extraordinary motivation 
based upon strain or psychological abnormalities and, instead, argued that 
crime was due to rational self-interest and could be understood like any 
other kind of economic activity: “[A] useful theory of criminal behavior can 
dispense with special theories of anomie, psychological inadequacies, or 
inheritance of special traits and simply extend the economist’s usual 
analysis of choice.”
  At long last, 
the battle between deterrence and other possible state responses to crime 
was waged, at least in part, on empirical grounds. 
82
assumes that a person commits an offense if the expected utility to them exceeds the 
utility he could get by using his time and other resources at other activities . . . .  Some 
persons become “criminals,” therefore, not because their basic motivation differs from 
that of other persons, but because their benefits and costs differ.
  The economist’s “usual analysis of choice” was a 
rational choice model of criminal behavior that 
83
Becker argued that, in the expected utility model, the decision to offend is 
made up of the costs and benefits of both crime and non-crime.
 
84  The costs 
include the formal legal punishments available for a crime, and Becker 
noted that the certainty of legal penalties are more important than their 
severity.85
 
79 Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 
169, 170 (1968). 
  Though obviously less sophisticated than Becker, Bentham’s 
theory of crime contained many of the same principles: criminal behavior 
requires no special motivation; behavior is a product of the utility of 
actions; the utility of an action is the net difference between the benefits and 
80 Jack P. Gibbs, Crime, Punishment, and Deterrence, 48 SOUTHWESTERN SOC. SCI. Q. 
515, 515-16 (1968). 
81 See generally JACK P. GIBBS, CRIME, PUNISHMENT, AND DETERRENCE (1975); 
FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON J. HAWKINS, DETERRENCE: THE LEGAL THREAT IN CRIME 
CONTROL (1973); Nagin, supra note 77; Paternoster, supra note 77.  
82 Becker, supra note 79, at 170. 
83 Id. at 176. 
84 Id. at 177-78. 
85 Id. at 178. 
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costs of that action; other things being equal, the action with the greatest 
utility will be selected among alternatives.86
Gibbs’s article that same year was much more Beccarian in that it 
focused exclusively on the role of punishment in criminal behavior and 
adopted a specific theory of criminal deterrence by legal sanctions rather 
than the more general expected utility theories of Bentham and Becker.
 
87  
Gibbs was less interested in discussing notions of utility and the diverse 
benefits and costs of crime than he was in the more specific question of 
whether or not actual punishment, implemented by authorities, was 
effective in reducing crime.  Gibbs also initiated an agenda of empirical 
research on the subject—something that had been missing throughout the 
previous two centuries—that examined the relationship between the 
certainty and severity of punishment in individual states and their crime 
rates.88  The importance of Gibbs’s article is that it provided an empirical 
example of how deterrence research could be done, and his finding of an 
inverse relationship between the certainty of punishment in a state and the 
homicide rate provided some support for those who believed that there was 
something to the deterrence argument.  Gibbs created convincing 
operational definitions of the certainty and severity of punishment for 
homicide across the several states and argued that if the deterrence doctrine 
was valid, then states where the certainty and severity of punishment were 
higher would have lower homicide rates.89  This is precisely what he found, 
providing empirical evidence that perhaps punishment is effective in 
generating compliance with the laws.90  Gibbs’s confirmation of general 
deterrence initiated a veritable cottage industry of deterrence research 
among sociologists and criminologists.91  Subsequent research examined 
the deterrence of crimes other than homicide, entertained new measures of 
the certainty and severity of punishment, and pursued nagging 
methodological issues such as possible feedback effects between crime and 
punishment.92
 
86 See generally BENTHAM, supra note 
  By the early to mid-1970s, empirical and theoretical work in 
deterrence was a vibrant field, and the publication of two important books, 
Zimring and Hawkins’s Deterrence: The Legal Threat in Crime Control 
3. 
87 Gibbs, supra note 80. 
88 Id. at 523-25. 
89 Id. at 519-20. 
90 Id. at 524-25. 
91 For descriptions of this research, see GIBBS, supra note 81; ZIMRING & HAWKINS, 
supra note 81; Nagin, supra note 77. 
92 Paternoster, supra note 77.  See generally Nagin, supra note 77. 
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and Gibbs’s Crime, Punishment, and Deterrence, greatly helped to solidify 
interest in deterrence.93
Two important theoretical developments in deterrence work occurred 
later in the mid-1980s.  One development was that scholars began to 
understand deterrence theory as a theory about the perception of sanction 
threats and the relationship between those perceptions and self-reported 
behavior.
 
94  This stood in contrast to research and theorizing from the mid-
1960s to the late 1970s, which mainly dealt with the objective properties of 
punishment.95  The charge began when Geerken and Gove developed a 
perceptual theory of deterrence,96 after which scholars began to understand 
deterrence as a social psychological theory of threat communication and to 
realize that if the objective properties of punishment are important, it is only 
because they affect crime through individual perceptions.97  The 
restatement of deterrence as a perceptual theory, and therefore a theory at 
the individual or micro-level, led to another outpouring of deterrence 
research that began in the mid-1970s and continues to the present day.98
In addition to a conception of deterrence that emphasized a perceptual 
dimension, a second important theoretical development in deterrence theory 
occurred in the mid-1980s.  Traditionally, deterrence theory had been 
restricted to the proposition that the imposition or the threat of the 




93 See GIBBS, supra note 
  The definition 
of deterrence provided by Gibbs is a perfect example of this: “Deterrence 
can be thought of as the omission of an act as a response to the perceived 
risk and fear of punishment for contrary behavior.  Since the deterrence 
81; ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 81. 
94 GIBBS, supra note 81, at 115. 
95 See, e.g., Gibbs, supra note 80; Charles H. Logan, General Deterrent Effects of 
Imprisonment, 51 SOC. FORCES 64 (1972); Charles R. Tittle, Crime Rates and Legal 
Sanctions, 16 SOC. PROBS. 409 (1969). 
96 Michael R. Geerken & Walter R. Gove, Deterrence: Some Theoretical Considerations, 
9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 497 (1975); see also Gordon P. Waldo & Theodore G. Chiricos, 
Perceived Penal Sanction and Self-Reported Criminality: A Neglected Approach to 
Deterrence Research, 19 SOC. PROBS. 522 (1972). 
97 GIBBS, supra note 81, at 15-16. 
98 See, e.g., Waldo & Chiricos, supra note 96; Linda Saltzman et al., Deterrent and 
Experiential Effects: The Problem of Causal Order in Perceptual Deterrence Research, 28 J. 
RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 172 (1982); Maynard L. Erickson, Jack P. Gibbs & Gary F. Jensen, 
The Deterrence Doctrine and the Perceived Certainty of Legal Punishments, 42 AM. SOC. 
REV. 305 (1977); Thomas Loughran et al., Reassessing the Certainty Effect in Deterrence 
Theory: Insights From Prospect Theory (Jan. 25, 2010) (unpublished manuscript, on file 
with author). 
99 See GIBBS, supra note 81, at 2. 
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doctrine focuses on crime, the acts in question are violations of criminal 
laws and the punishments are ‘legal.’”100
Later, the conceptual boundaries of deterrence theory were gradually 
expanded.  In 1986, Williams and Hawkins argued that any inhibition of 
crime that was brought about directly or indirectly by the threat of legal 
sanctions should be considered part of the deterrence process.
 
101  They drew 
a distinction between punishment that is based upon the criminal act itself 
and punishment that is based upon any legal reaction to the criminal act.102
Around the same time, rational choice models of crime were being 
developed in criminology,
  
For example, if I refrain from drinking and driving because I fear that my 
spouse will think less of me if she finds out that I have been drinking and 
driving, my inhibition is not due to deterrence but to an extralegal process 
(social censure or embarrassment).  However, if I refrain from drinking and 
driving because I fear that if I am arrested my spouse will think less of me 
because of the arrest, then since her disapproval is triggered by the arrest 
and not the act itself, my avoidance of drinking and driving is to be 
considered an instance of deterrence.  Williams and Hawkins essentially 
added a new cluster of right-hand-side variables to the deterrence equation 
so that it included inhibition due to the threat of legal punishment, and 
inhibition due to the threat of social censure, commitment costs (fear of 
losing my job if arrested), and any self-imposed costs (guilt if I were 
arrested).   
103 and these models were decidedly inspired by 
both Bentham and Becker in that they included the full range of anticipated 
benefits and costs of crime.104  In content they were very much what 
Bentham described, and they were called subjective expected utility models 
because they were predicated on the perceived or subjectively understood 
costs and benefits of criminal offending,105 something that Ball argued for 
three decades earlier in the Journal.106
 
100 Id. at 2. 
  At this point, a pure deterrence 
model was blended into a more general rational choice model of crime in 
which anticipated legal costs are simply one of several factors considered 
by rational and reasoning would-be offenders. 
101 Kirk R. Williams & Richard Hawkins, Perceptual Research on General Deterrence: 
A Critical Review, 20 LAW & SOC’Y REV 545, 561-66 (1986). 
102 Id. at 558-61. 
103 See CORNISH & CLARKE, supra note 32. 
104 Pamela Lattimore & Ann Witte, Models of Decision Making Under Uncertainty: The 
Criminal Choice, in THE REASONING CRIMINAL 129, supra note 32, at 131-34.  
105 Id. 
106 Ball, supra note 65, at 351. 
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With this basic history of deterrence theory completed, the next section 
provides a summary of the major hypotheses and research questions posed 
by the theory.  This is followed by a brief examination of the existing 
empirical support for each of the hypotheses. 
III. BASIC PRINCIPLES OF DETERRENCE THEORY 
Deterrence theory is a theory of crime that presumes that human 
beings are rational enough to consider the consequences of their actions and 
to be influenced by those consequences.107  Generally, as self-interested and 
relatively free agents, human beings are influenced by the benefits and costs 
of their actions.  Virtually any human activity can be understood as 
resulting in both benefits and costs, and persons are presumed to be rational 
enough to weigh the costs and benefits of any action and any reasonable 
alternative courses of action.  The behavior with the greatest advantage of 
benefits over costs (the one resulting in greater utility) is presumed to be the 
behavior with the highest probability of being acted upon.  Deterrence 
theorists presume, therefore, that human beings are self-interested, rational, 
and reasoning creatures.108  An implication of this view is that an innate 
propensity to commit crime is not possessed by some people but not by 
others (the Positive School’s notion of “differentiation” between criminals 
and non-criminals)109 but instead resides in everyone.110  Since we are all 
motivated by self-interest, we all have the capacity to commit crime when 
the benefits of crime exceed the costs.  Similarly, we are all motivated to go 
to college or get married if the benefits of post-secondary education and 
marriage are thought to be greater than the costs.  In other words, crime is 
no different than other behavior and criminals are no different than non-
criminals—what differs across people are their assessments of the costs and 
benefits of different lines of action.111
As a human activity, crime comes with its own stock of benefits and 
costs.  As suggested above, the decision to commit crime is no different 
than the decision to go to college or to get married—it is made by 
reasonable, rational agents who are self-interested and select behaviors that 
provide more rewards than costs.  This means that crime does not have to 
be explained by any extraordinary motivation—or any motivation at all—
 
 
107 DAVID M. KENNEDY, DETERRENCE AS CRIME PREVENTION: RECONSIDERING THE 
PROSPECT OF SANCTION 15-23 (2008); ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 81, at 106-08. 
108 See generally BENTHAM, supra note 3; GIBBS, supra note 81; ZIMRING & HAWKINS, 
supra note 81. 
109 See TAYLOR ET AL., supra note 42, at 24-26. 
110 Id. 
111 Lattimore & Witte, supra note 104. 
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other than self-interest.112  Most of the time, people are not compelled to 
commit criminal acts113 but do so when the expected benefits outweigh the 
expected gains.  A key term in deterrence theory, therefore, is the notion of 
utility, which simply refers to the total satisfaction that is derived from a 
course of action or consumption.114
U(Crime) =  p
  A very simple equation to express the 
basic premise of deterrence theory is that an individual will decide to offend 
if: 
1 (Benefits of Crime) + p2 (Costs of Crime)  
  + p3 (Benefits of Non-Crime) + p4
This equation states that the utility of crime is equal to the sum of the 
benefits of crime (easy money, the “high” of drug use, prestige, or “rep”), 
the costs of crime (getting arrested, getting convicted, going to jail, loss of 
family respect, not seeing one’s children while in jail or prison), the 
benefits of non-crime (a steady and safe income from a job, physical 
security from not being shot or falling ill from ingesting bad drugs), and the 
costs of non-crime (low wages, feeling like a failure from a low-prestige 
job).  The p’s reflect the probability of each event occurring.  The utility of 
crime, then, is determined not only by the outcomes, but by the probability 
of those outcomes. 
 (Costs of  Non-Crime)  (1.1) 
One of the costs of crime is the possible legal punishment, including 
being arrested for committing the act, getting convicted of the crime, and 
being subjected to some kind of punishment as a result of conviction (jail, 
probation, prison, or, in some jurisdictions for some crimes, death).  
Deterrence theorists presume that punishment by the legal system will 
increase the cost of—and therefore inhibit—crime.115
 
112 BENTHAM, supra note 
  There are three 
properties of legal punishment that are related to its cost, the (1) certainty, 
(2) severity, and (3) celerity (or swiftness) of punishment.  Other things 
being equal, a legal punishment is more costly when it is more certain 
(more likely than not to be a consequence of crime), severe (greater in 
magnitude), and swift (the punishment arrives sooner rather than later after 
the offense).  This leads to the three key hypotheses that can be deduced 
3, at 1-2. 
113 The fact that most crime can be explained as rational and self-interested behavior 
does not mean that all crime has to be so explained in order for the theory to be valid.  Some 
crimes are committed by people who are under the influence of strong compulsions or 
emotional forces that co-opt or minimize rational thinking.  See Daniel Ariely & George 
Loewenstein, The Heat of the Moment: The Effect of Sexual Arousal on Sexual Decision 
Making, 19 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 87 (2006) (showing the effect of emotions on 
decision making); George Loewenstein, Out of Control: Visceral Influences on Behavior, 65 
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 272 (1996) (same).  
114 BENTHAM, supra note 3, at 2-3. 
115 GIBBS, supra note 81, at 5, ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 81, at 1-9. 
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from deterrence theory, which have served to guide empirical research over 





: The greater the certainty of legal punishment, the lower the crime rate. 
2
H
: The greater the severity of legal punishment, the lower the crime rate. 
3
The important deterrence variables are, then, certainty, severity, and 
celerity.  There are two levels of these punishment properties, an objective 
level and a subjective (or perceptual) level.  In general, the criminal justice 
system is premised in part on the expectation that having rigorously 
enforced laws and appropriate penalties that are applied with reasonable 
swiftness will lower crime by deterring punished persons from offending 
again and deterring would-be offenders from committing new crimes.  How 
certainly, severely, and swiftly a jurisdiction actually responds to crime 
constitutes the objective properties of punishment.
: The greater the celerity of legal punishment, the lower the crime rate. 
117
 A legal jurisdiction can hope to reduce crime by increasing the number 
of law enforcement officers on the street, thereby increasing the certainty 
with which an offender would be caught for misdeeds.
  For example, if ten of 
every one hundred armed robbers are arrested in City X, then the objective 
certainty of arrest for armed robbery is 0.10.  If the average prison term 
imposed by judges for those convicted of armed robbery is seven years, 
then one indicator of the objective severity of punishment is seven years in 
prison. 
118  This was the 
intention of President Clinton’s effort in 1994 to add 100,000 new police 
officers by the year 2000.119  Increasing the number of police officers on the 
street was an attempt to increase the objective certainty of punishment.  A 
jurisdiction can also attempt to reduce crime by increasing the penalty or 
punishment for an act even without affecting its certainty.  For example, 
many states have passed felony firearm laws that enhance the severity of 
punishment for a felony offense if the offender uses or threatens to use a 
firearm.120
Of course, even Bentham was aware that the objective properties of 
punishment work to inhibit crimes by increasing how the certainty, severity, 
  The purpose of such laws is to increase the cost of the crime and 
deter would-be offenders from using guns when committing crimes.  
 
116 GIBBS, supra note 81, at 5. 
117 Id. at 8. 
118 See generally id.; KENNEDY, supra note 107; MARK A.R. KLEIMAN, WHEN BRUTE 
FORCE FAILS: HOW TO HAVE LESS CRIME AND LESS PUNISHMENT (2009). 
119 William N. Evans & Emily G. Owens, COPS and Crime, 91 J. PUB. ECON. 181, 182 
(2007). 
120 KENNEDY, supra note 107, at 10, 13. 
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and celerity of punishments are perceived by would-be offenders.121  In 
other words, legislators establish and modify the objective properties of 
punishment with the expectation that the perceptual properties of 
punishment will be affected.  The perceptual properties of punishment are 
those properties that are thought to exist in a jurisdiction by its population 
of offenders and would-be offenders.122
Deterrence theorists presume that there is a strong positive correlation 
between the objective and subjective (perceptual) properties of punishment.  
The relationship between these two properties of punishment cannot, 
however, be taken for granted.  This relationship is first of all empirical, 
and the relationship between the two likely falls far short of unity.  
Moreover, the subjective properties of punishment are likely affected by 
things other than the objective properties of punishment.  Since the 
objective properties of punishment matter for deterrence theory only to the 
extent that the perceptual properties are affected, the magnitude and nature 
of the relationship between the objective and perceptual properties of 
punishment is an important consideration for deterrence theory and public 
policy.
  For example, in the hypothetical 
jurisdiction above in which ten out of one hundred armed robbers were 
arrested, the objective certainty of arrest for armed robbery was 0.10.  It 
may be, however, that would-be armed robbers think that the probability of 
being caught and arrested if they commit armed robbery is much higher 
(0.25) or much lower (0.05) than what it actually is.  Similarly, a state may 
pass a felony firearm law, enhancing the penalty for felonies committed 
with a gun, hoping to reduce the proportion of such crimes.  The state 
would pass such a law with the expectation that the increased punishment 
that could be inflicted under the law will be recognized by the public, 
including would-be felons. 
123
The causal process of deterrence is illustrated in Figure 1.  The dashed 
line connecting the objective properties of punishment to crime indicates 
that crime control policies are frequently manipulated to reduce crime and 
operate under the assumption that the perceptual properties of punishment 
will change as well, without explicit empirical proof that they have 
changed.  The important conclusion to be drawn from Figure 1 is that in 
 
  At its core, therefore, deterrence theory is a social psychological 
theory of threat communication in which the causal chain runs from the 
objective properties of punishment through the perceptual properties of 
punishment to crime.   
 
121 BENTHAM, supra note 3, at 43. 
122 GIBBS, supra note 81, at 7. 
123 Id. at 115. 
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Figure 1 




   
 
 
order for deterrence to occur, a lot must happen.  For an increase in the 
number of police officers to affect the crime rate, for example, there must 
be a perception among the class of would-be offenders that the certainty of 
punishment has increased, and this increase must be connected to their 
refraining from crime.  Similarly, whether or not the certainty of 
enforcement or punishment increases with the use of incarceration, it cannot 
have a deterrent effect unless it affects the perceptions of those who are 
contemplating offending and those intentions to offend are altered by the 
increased risk of sanctions. 
From the causal schema in Figure 1, one can deduce some more 
precise deterrence hypotheses that can be subject to empirical tests: 
H1
H
: Other things being equal, there should be an inverse relationship between 




: Other things being equal, there should be a positive relationship between 
the objective properties of punishment (certainty, severity, celerity) and the 
perceptual properties. 
3: Other things being equal, there should be an inverse relationship between 
the perceptual properties of punishment (certainty, severity, celerity) and 
measures of criminal offending. 
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Figure 1 illustrates the causal process assumed by deterrence theory at the 
most general level.  I use this model as the basic framework for discussing 
the empirical literature pertaining to deterrence theory.   
 The causal process of deterrence is made up of three distinct links.  
The first link is that between the objective properties of punishment and 
crime rates.  It is presumed that the law enforcement and punishment 
policies of legal jurisdictions are inversely related to crime levels in those 
jurisdictions.124  If this relationship can be demonstrated empirically, it can 
be attributed to a deterrent effect only if: (a) there is a link between criminal 
justice practices and perceptions of those practices on the part of offenders 
and would-be offenders and (b) the reduction in crime is not due to some 
other mechanism (such as the incapacitation of high-rate offenders).  
Research on the link between the objective properties of punishment and 
crime rates assumes, but does not demonstrate, that the second link—that 
between the objective and perceptual properties of punishment—exists.125
 There is a substantial volume of existing research about the possible 
deterrent value of various criminal justice policies (policing practices, 
sentencing, and prison) and aggregate levels of crime, and between 
perceptions of sanction threats and offending at the individual level.
  
The third link in the process is that between the perceived properties of 
punishment and some measure of self-reported offending.   
126  
There is much less research, however, on the relationship between the 
objective and perceptual properties of punishment.127
IV.  THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OBJECTIVE SANCTIONS 
AND CRIME RATES 
 
The first hypothesis states that there should be an inverse relationship 
between the objective properties of legal sanctions and crime rates.  More 
specifically, increasing the certainty, severity, and celerity of legal sanctions 
should result in lower levels of crime.  A very good point to begin this 
analysis of deterrence is long-term crime trends in the United States.  
Figure 2 shows the rate of property and violent index crimes for the United 
States over the period from 1962 to 2008.  It reveals that, from the early 
1960s until the 1980s, there was a steady increase in both property and 
violent index crimes.  From the late 1970s until about the mid-1980s, both 
rates of crime slightly declined.  There followed several years of increases 
in crime, particularly for violent index offenses, with both rates reaching 
 
124 Id. at 5. 
125 See Nagin, supra note 77, at 26 
126 KENNEDY, supra note 118, at 9-14 
127 Nagin, supra note 77, at 5-6. 
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peaks in 1991.  After 1991, however, there was a consistent and substantial 
decline in the rate of both property and violent crime up to the year 2000—
what has become known as “the great crime drop.”128  Both property and 
violent crime rates continued to decline in the years leading up to 2008, but 
at a much slower rate.  The decline in crime over the period from 1990 to 
2008 was very gradual and consistent, but also remarkable in its cumulative 
magnitude.  By 2008, the rate of violent crime was down about 66% from 
its level in 1992, while the property crime rate had declined by about 53%.  
This decline in crime occurred across all regions of the country, in both 
urban and rural areas, and for all index crime categories.129  Quite literally, 
the bottom fell out of crime.  In trying to account for this dramatic and 
long-term decline in crime, it is imperative to examine the criminal justice 
system and determine whether changes in deterrence-related policies might 
have had a hand creating the decline.  A couple of suspects come readily to 
mind—the police and the use of imprisonment. 
 
Figure 2 

















   
 
Source:  Uniform Crime Reports. 
 
128 ALFRED BLUMSTEIN & JOEL WALLMAN, THE CRIME DROP IN AMERICA 1-12 (2000). 
129 UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING PROGRAM, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIME IN THE UNITED 
STATES—2001: SECTION 2: CRIME INDEX OFFENSES REPORTED 64 tbl.1 (2002), available at 
http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius_01/01crime2.pdf.  See generally FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE 
GREAT AMERICAN CRIME DECLINE (2007). 
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A. THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IN DETERRENCE 
In 1994, President Clinton signed the Violent Crime Control and Law 
Enforcement Act, which initiated many policies aimed at increasing the 
deterrent bite of the law, including new firearms restrictions, tougher 
sentencing laws, and a plan to put 100,000 new police officers on the 
street.130  There is evidence that, as a result of federal funding, there was a 
noticeable increase in the number and per capita rate of police officers in 
the United States beginning in the early 1990s.131  Although it is difficult to 
say for sure, one estimate indicated that there was an increase of 
approximately 50,000 to 60,000 police officers in the United States (a per 
capita expansion of about 14%).132  The intended effect of putting more 
police officers on the streets was to increase the objective probability or 
certainty of arrest, with a subsequent deterrent effect on the crime rate.  In 
addition to a sheer increase in numbers, however, police began 
experimenting with more targeted strategies of enforcement in the 1990s.  
They started using technology to identify geographic areas of high crime or 
“hot spots,” and they engaged in “crackdowns” that targeted particular 
kinds of crime, such as drug dealing and weapons offenses, with enhanced 
enforcement.133  It is possible that the rather dramatic decrease in crime 
observed in the United States since the 1990s was due to the combination of 
more police and better policing. 
With respect to the role of the police, many scholars have concluded—
although there is some dispute about this—that at least some of the decline 
in crime rates can be attributed to an increase in the number of police and 
the increased certainty of punishment associated with that increase.134  That 
an increase in police presence would have the effect of producing some 
reduction in crime can be anticipated by previous research that showed a 
connection between the two.  James Q. Wilson and Barbara Boland  
conducted one of the first comprehensive studies of the general effect of 
police behavior on crime rates.135  They examined the effect of aggressive 
 
130 Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994). 
131 BRIAN A. REAVES & MATTHEW J. HICKMAN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, POLICE DEPARTMENTS IN LARGE CITIES, 1990-2000 (2002). 
132 Steven D. Levitt, Understanding Why Crime Fell in the 1990s: Four Factors That 
Explain the Decline and Six That Do Not, 18 J. ECON. PERSPS. 163, 177 (2004). 
133 Christopher S. Koper & Evan Mayo-Wilson, Police Crackdowns on Illegal Gun 
Carrying: A Systematic Review of Their Impact on Gun Crime, 2 J. EXPERIMENTAL 
CRIMINOLOGY 227, 228-51 (2006); Leavitt, supra note 132, at 172. 
134 See JOHN ECK & EDWARD R. MAGUIRE, Have Changes in Policing Reduced Violent 
Crime?: An Assessment of the Evidence, in THE CRIME DROP IN AMERICA 207 (Alfred 
Blumstein & Joel Wallman eds., 2000). 
135 James Q. Wilson & Barbara Boland, The Effect of the Police on Crime, 12 LAW & 
SOC’Y REV. 367 (1978). 
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police patrolling practices (having patrol units on the street stopping cars 
and issuing moving citations) on robbery rates in thirty-five American 
cities.136  Consistent with the expected deterrent effect of increased police 
activity, they found that robbery rates across cities were inversely related to 
the arrest ratios for robberies—in cities in which a higher proportion of 
robberies resulted in an arrest, the robbery rate was lower.137  In addition, 
they found that the arrest ratio for robbery was higher in those cities that 
employed more aggressive police patrolling practices.138  The authors 
concluded that more police cars out on the street “doing something,” such 
as issuing citations, increased their visibility, creating a higher certainty and 
severity of punishment (as evidenced by higher arrest ratios), which in turn 
is related to lower crime rates.139
Robert J. Sampson and Jacqueline Cohen replicated Wilson and 
Boland’s work in a study of all 171 U.S. cities with populations greater than 
100,000 in 1980.
   
140  Sampson and Cohen examined the relationship 
between aggressive policing (defined as the number of arrests per police 
officer for disorderly conduct and driving under the influence) and robbery 
and burglary rates.  Similar to Wilson and Boland, they found that police 
aggressiveness was associated with increased levels of arrest certainty for 
both robbery and burglary.141
Thomas B. Marvell and Carlisle E. Moody and Steven D. Levitt 
conducted two additional studies about the deterrent effect of sheer police 
presence.  In both studies, the researchers examined the relationship 
between the number of police officers per capita (in forty-nine U.S. states 
and fifty-six large cities during the period from 1973 to 1992 for Marvell 
and Moody, and in fifty-nine U.S. cities from 1970 to 1992 for Levitt) and 
measures of serious felony crime rates.
  These two sets of findings suggest that what 
the police do can affect the objective certainty of punishment.  
142  Consistent with deterrence 
theory, Marvell and Moody found a significant inverse relationship between 
the number of police officers and state-level homicide, robbery, and 
burglary rates.143
 
136 Id. at 372-74. 
  At the city level, a deterrent effect was found for total 
137 Id. at 375-76. 
138 Id. at 378. 
139 Id. 
140 Robert J. Sampson & Jacqueline Cohen, Deterrent Effects of the Police on Crime: A 
Replication and Theoretical Extension, 22 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 163, 169 (1988). 
141 Id. at 175-83. 
142 Thomas B. Marvell & Carlisle E. Moody, Specification Problems, Police Levels, and 
Crime Rates, 34 CRIMINOLOGY 609, 623 (1996); Steven D. Levitt, Using Electoral Cycles in 
Police Hiring to Estimate the Effect of Police on Crime, 87 AM. ECON. REV. 270, 271 (1997). 
143 Marvell & Moody, supra note 142, at 630. 
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crimes, homicide, robbery, burglary, larceny, and auto theft.  Moreover, the 
magnitude of the effects were non-trivial; they estimated that each 
additional police officer resulted in a reduction of about four crimes at the 
state level and twenty-four crimes at the city level.144  Similarly, Levitt 
found that an increase in the number of police reduced crime by an average 
of approximately 5% to 8% across different crime types—with a greater 
effect for violent than property crimes.145  With a different identification 
strategy than that used in his earlier paper, Levitt found, in a city-level data 
set which included 122 cities and covered the years from 1975 to 1995, that 
the number of police officers reduced both the violent and property crime 
rate by approximately 5%.146
There are, then, empirical grounds for the belief that at least some of 
the crime drop since the 1990s was due to the increase in the number of 
police officers.  New York City experienced the largest drop in crime for 
any major U.S. city over this time period, with declines that were about 
twice the national average; it also experienced a uniquely dramatic increase 
in the number of police officers.
 
147  Zimring noted that in the ten-year 
period from 1990 to 2000, New York City had a 23% increase in the 
number of police per 100,000 population, compared with only a 2.6% 
increase in police per capita in nine of the other largest U.S. cities.148  The 
New York Police Department (NYPD) also modified its style of policing 
during that decade, introducing the COMPSTAT management/organization 
system, which promised a more rationally targeted allocation of police 
resources.  There were other changes to the way the NYPD did its police 
work during this period including a “zero tolerance” policy with respect to 
minor offending.149  It was believed that more certain and severe 
enforcement of public drunkenness, littering, panhandling, and other public 
order laws would have a broader deterrent effect by serving notice that the 
police were vigilant about all crime.  Given the “stew” of many changes in 
policing undergone by the NYPD during that time period, it is exceedingly 
difficult to separate any unique sources of deterrence.150
 
144 Id. at 632. 
  Nevertheless, 
there is some evidence that police size and strategy had some deterrent 
145 Steven D. Levitt, supra note 142, at 280-83 tbl.5 (1997). 
146 Steven D. Levitt, Reply, Using Electoral Cycles in Police Hiring to Estimate the 
Effect of Police on Crime: Reply, 92 AM. ECON. REV.1244, 1245, 1248-49 tbls.3 & 4 (2002). 
147 See ZIMRING, supra note 129, at 137 fig.6.1, 145 fig.6.5, 149 fig.6.7.  
148 See id. at 149 fig.6.7. 
149 Id. at 149-52. 
150 Id. at 156-58. 
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impact on crime, although the magnitude of that impact is very difficult to 
gauge.151
In one study, Hope Corman and H. Naci Mocan examined serious 
felony crime rates (murder, robbery, burglary, motor vehicle theft) in New 
York City during the period from 1970 to 1996 and how changes in those 
rates reflected changes in the monthly number of arrests and the number of 
police officers in the NYPD.
 
152  Consistent with a deterrent effect, they 
found that murders, robberies, burglaries, and thefts of motor vehicles 
significantly declined in response to increases in the arrest rate for each 
crime, and that robberies and burglaries declined with increases in the 
number of police officers.153  Rosenfeld and his colleagues examined 
whether COMPSTAT had an impact on New York City homicide rates over 
the 1992-2001 period.154  They concluded that the decline in both general 
homicides and gun-related homicides in New York City did not deviate 
from the average decline experienced in other cities, indicating that those 
decreases were not likely due to the introduction of COMPSTAT.155  
However, they did not analyze whether the general decline in crime in New 
York City since 2001 was due to COMPSTAT.156
A few studies have looked specifically at whether and how much of 
the crime decline in the 1990s in the United States could be attributed to 
more police officers.  These additional hires were due to federal funding 
from the 1994 Crime Control Act through the COPS program.
 
157  Evans and 
Owens examined both the hiring of new police officers and the effect of 
those newly hired officers on city-level crime rates.158  Using annual data 
from 1990 to 2001 from 2,074 cities (each with a population over 10,000), 
they found that the more officers that were added to city police 
departments, the lower the rates for all seven index offenses.159  The 
reduction in crime was statistically significant for auto thefts, burglaries, 
robberies, and aggravated assaults and was marginally significant for 
murder.160
 
151 Id. at 168. 
  Levitt estimated that the COPS program increased the number 
152 Hope Corman & H. Naci Mocan, A Time-Series Analysis of Crime, Deterrence, and 
Drug Abuse in New York City, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 584, 586-87 (2000). 
153 Id. at 595-601. 
154 Richard Rosenfeld et al., Did Ceasefire, Compstat, and Exile Reduce Homicide?, 4 
CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 419, 428 (2005). 
155 Id. at 431, 432 fig.1. 
156 See id. at 431-33. 
157 Evans & Owens, supra note 119, at 181. 
158 Id.  
159 Id. at 195-99 tbls.5 & 6. 
160 Id. at 195. 
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of police officers per capita by 14% during the 1990s.161  He further 
estimated that the increase in the number of police during this time period 
was responsible for a 5% to 6% reduction in crime, accounting for between 
one-fifth and one-tenth of the overall drop in crime.162
To be fair, not all scholars agree with Levitt’s assessment.  John Eck 
and Edward Maguire published an extensive review of the existing research 
on the relationship between the number of police officers and crime rates 
and whether police force size was related to the downturn in crime.
   
163  Two 
interesting things came out of their review.  First, they were struck with the 
general lack of quality in a great deal of this research.  Out of forty-one 
studies that they identified as helpful in dealing with the issue, they found 
only nine that dealt rigorously enough with methodological problems to 
come to a confident conclusion.164  Second, based upon their review of 
these nine studies, they concluded that the police had no real effect on the 
drop in crime over the 1990s: “[T]he research suggests that hiring more 
police officers did not play an independent or consistent role in reducing 
violent crime in the United States.”165
In addition to this research on police presence, a substantial body of 
literature examines the deterrent effect of particular police practices on the 
crime rate, such as “police crackdowns” on certain kinds of crime or 




161 Levitt, supra note 
  
The idea behind police crackdowns and hot-spot policing is to increase the 
certainty of arrest and punishment for particular crimes or particular 
132, at 177. 
162 Id. at 177. 
163 ECK & MAGUIRE, supra note 134. 
164 Id. at 217.  
165 Id.  
166 See generally DAVID M. KENNEDY, DETERRENCE AND CRIME PREVENTION: 
RECONSIDERING THE PROSPECT OF SANCTION (2009); Mark A.R. Kleiman, The Effect of 
Intensive Enforcement on Retail Heroin Dealing, in STREET-LEVEL DRUG ENFORCEMENT: 
EXAMINING THE ISSUES 3 (Marcia R. Chaiken ed., 1988); Lawrence W. Sherman, Police 
Crackdowns: Initial and Residual Deterrence, in 12 CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF 
RESEARCH 1 (Michael Tonry & Norval Morris eds., 1990); Lawrence W. Sherman, Policing 
for Crime Prevention, in EVIDENCE-BASED CRIME PREVENTION 295 (Lawrence W. Sherman 
et al. eds., 2002); Anthony A. Braga, Hot Spots Policing and Crime Prevention: A 
Systematic Review of Randomized Controlled Trials, 1 J. EXPERIMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY 317 
(2005); Christopher S. Koper & Evan Mayo-Wilson, Police Crackdowns on Illegal Gun 
Carrying: A Systematic Review of Their Impact on Gun Crime, 2 J. EXPERIMENTAL 
CRIMINOLOGY 227 (2006); David Weisburd, Hot Spots Policing Experiments and Criminal 
Justice Research: Lessons from the Field, 599 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 220 
(2005); Mark A. R. Kleiman, Bringing Back Street-Level Heroin Enforcement (John F. 
Kennedy Sch. of Gov’t, Program in Criminal Justice Policy and Mgmt., Working Paper No. 
80-01-08, 1986). 
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geographic areas with greatly intensified police activity.167  For example, if 
there is a two-block area in a given city in which the crime rate is 
particularly high (prostitution, drug sales, robberies), extra police could be 
assigned, traffic flow restricted, an on-site booking facility set up, and a 
cleaning up of vacant areas and abandoned buildings, all in a concerted 
effort to bring additional law enforcement muscle to the area.  One would 
expect the increased police presence and law enforcement activity to 
increase the perception among would-be offenders that the certainty and 
severity of sanctions has increased and that, as a result of these changed 
perceptions, crime will be deterred.168  Reviews of this literature are more 
optimistic than definitive.  Many studies are simply too poorly conducted to 
draw precise or even realistic assessments about whether the particular 
police effort deterred crime.  Many studies, in fact, show that even with 
massive police effort the return in reduced crime is marginal.169
Interestingly, these studies frequently show that there is evidence of 
crime displacement, whereby crime increases in areas geographically 
proximate to the targeted area.
  At least 
some of these studies show that crime is reduced in a given area while the 
crack-down or enhanced police presence exists, but that crime quickly 
returns to its pre-intervention level soon after the program ends. 
170  What program evaluators must do, 
therefore, is balance the deterrent effects achieved in one area with the 
crime displacement effects that occur in other areas.  Although troubling 
from a policy perspective, that criminals simply “move around the corner” 
in response to increased police presence to commit crime in another area is 
perfectly compatible with (and indeed expected by) deterrence theory and 
the belief in a rational offender.171  A reasoning offender would respond to 
the increased probability of legal sanctions in one area by relocating to an 
area with a lower certainty of apprehension.  The rational offender would 
then return to his normal “haunts” once the extra police activity brought on 
by the crackdown in the original area is removed.172
 
167 KENNEDY, supra note 
  Those committing 
166, at 10-11. 
168 Id. 
169 See generally id.; Richard A. Berk, Reaction Essay, Knowing When to Fold ’Em: An 
Essay on Evaluating the Impact of Ceasefire, Compstat, and Exile, 4 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. 
POL’Y 451 (2005); Rosenfeld et al., supra note 154.  For an example, see the evaluations of 
the Boston youth violence crackdown known as “Operation Ceasefire.”  See KENNEDY, 
supra note 166, at 8; Berk, supra note 169, at 455-59; Rosenfeld et al., supra note 154, at 
434-35. 
170 David Weisburd & John E. Eck, What Can Police Do to Reduce Crime, Disorder, and 
Fear?, 593 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 42, 52 (2004). 
171 David Weisburd et al., Does Crime Just Move around the Corner?: A Controlled 
Study of Spatial Displacement of Crime Control Benefits, 44 CRIMINOLOGY 549 (2006). 
172 Nagin, supra note 77, at 9-11. 
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crimes in the targeted area may rationally reduce their level of offending 
until they notice that the risk is either not as great as they thought or police 
enforcement has slackened or withdrawn.173
What can we say about this very copious body of research on both the 
number of police and policing styles intended to deter crime?  
Unfortunately, nothing precise.  It is undoubtedly true that increasing the 
number of police officers who patrol an area does lower the amount of 
crime in that area, targeted police work with enhanced activity likely lowers 
crime, and at least some part of the "great crime drop" can be attributed to 
an increase in the number of police officers added to the force as a result of 
federal funding.  But even these very minimal conclusions must be taken 
with a healthy dose of skepticism, and we can say with even less confidence 
how much deterrent effect extra police officers and targeted policing have 
had. 
 
We should conclude that it is only probably true that added police 
contributed to the crime drop for several reasons.  First, from 1990 to 2000, 
in addition to an increase in the number of police officers in many U.S. 
cities, there was also great experimentation with different policing 
strategies.  It is difficult to disentangle the impact of more police from the 
impact of what those police were doing.174  Second, while it is true that 
crime rates dropped while cities were adding more police officers to their 
force—including the greatest decline in New York City, which also had the 
greatest increase in number of police officers—the relationship between 
more police and a reduction in crime is not always clear.175  Figure 3 shows 
the percent change in the number of police per 100,000 residents and the 
percent change in the rate of violent index crime for a selection of U.S. 
cities over the years 1990-2000.  While many cities saw an increase in the 
number of police and a corresponding reduction in violent crime, this was 
not always the case.  For example, San Diego experienced approximately a 
45% decline in violent crime with only a 1% increase in its police force.176  
Dallas saw more than a 40% reduction in violent crime along with an 8% 
reduction in the size of its police force.177  Seattle saw a sizable reduction in 
crime (about 44%) with a 9% reduction in its police force.  Philadelphia had 




  Baltimore had a 20% increase in its police with no discernable 
174 ZIMRING, supra note 129, at 149-52. 
175 See REAVES & HICKMAN, supra note 131. 
176 Id. app. A at 10, app. D at 13. 
177 Id.  
178 Id.  
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effect on crime.179
 
  Clearly, while the number of police can influence the 
amount of crime a city experiences, we do not know how much it matters, 
and other things seem to matter a great deal as well. 
Figure 3 
Percent Change 1990-2000 in the Number of Sworn Police and the Violent 
Crime Rate (per 100,000) 
Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics Special Report. Police Departments in Large Cities, 
1990-2000. May 2002. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice. 
 
New York City did observe the most dramatic decline in it crime rate 
of any U.S. city from 1990 to 2000, and it did so while increasing the size 
of its police force more than any other city.  It also introduced new police 
strategies such as COMPSTAT and “zero tolerance” policies.  However, 
questions have been raised about the veracity of the NYPD’s crime 
statistics program under COMPSTAT.180
 
179 Id.  
  A survey given to a group of 
more than one hundred retired NYPD captains and higher ranking officers 
indicated that they were aware of consistent and non-trivial efforts to 
produce lower crime statistics by “down-grading” citizen reports.  Down-
grading can entail either deliberately not recording certain crimes or putting 
180 William K. Rashbaum, Retired Officers Raise Questions on Crime Data, N.Y. TIMES, 
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pressure on citizens to withdraw their reports.181  Part of COMPSTAT’s 
program was to make individual police precinct commanders responsible 
for reductions of crime in their area to the point that people perceived that 
careers were at stake if crime did not go down.  Many who responded to the 
survey complained that city officials put great pressure on individual 
precinct commanders to reduce crime by any way possible.182  In the past, 
eleven police officials including four precinct commanders were disciplined 
by the department for attempting to tamper with crime statistics.183  In 
fairness, it must be mentioned that the COMPSTAT system had been 
independently reviewed by the state comptroller and a New York 
University professor who both concluded that the NYPD crime data were 
accurate and reliable.184  In addition, even conceding that police meddling 
with citizen complaints may have occurred, in order to have substantially 
contributed to a large share of the crime drop, the “fudging” of police 
statistics would have to have been done in virtually every major and mid-
sized U.S. city since the crime drop occurred everywhere.185
There is one other general point to be made here about how much one 
can attribute the crime drop in the United States to policies of the criminal 
justice system including enhanced police presence.  Following Zimring’s 
advice that comparisons of U.S. and Canadian crime statistics are 
instructive, Figure 4 shows the rate of violent and property crime for 
Canada over the years 1962-2008, and Figure 5 shows the homicide rate for 





  Much like the United States, Canada 
experienced a rise in crime that peaked in the early 1990s.  From 1990 to 
2000, Canadian crime rates fell as did those in the United States, though not 
by as much for violent crimes.  From 1990 to 2000, the Canadian violent 
crime rate fell by 10% while its property crime rate fell by 45%.  It is 
perhaps more instructive to compare particular crime categories for the 
United States and Canada (Table 1).  With the exception of auto theft, the 
general crime drop experienced by Canada is comparable to that found in 
the United States.  From 1990 to 2000, the homicide rate declined by 39% 
in the United States and by 34% in Canada, and the rape rate declined by 
22% in both countries.  Robberies decreased more in the United States than 
182 Id.  Complaints about police officials lowering crime by “cooking the books” have 
been made about other city police departments such as Atlanta, Baltimore, Dallas, New 
Orleans, and Washington.  Id. 
183 Rashbaum, supra note 180, at A1. 
184 Id. 
185 Id. 
186 SARA BEATTIE & AMY MOLE, CANADIAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE STATISTICS, POLICE 
RESOURCES IN CANADA, 2007 15 (2007); see also ZIMRING, supra note 129, at 107-34.  
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Figure 4 
Rate of Violent and Property Crime in Canada, 1962-2008 













Homicide Rate in the United States and Canada, 1962-2008 
 
Source:  Uniform Crime Reports and Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics. 
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Table 1 
Changes in Crime in United States and Canada, 1990-2000187 
 United States Canada 
Homicide -39% -34% 
Rape -22% -22% 
Aggravated Assault -24% -62% 
Robbery -44% -13% 
Burglary -41% -30% 
Auto Theft -37% 26% 
Larceny -23% -39% 
 
Canada (-44% compared to -13%), as did burglaries (-41% compared to 
-30%), but for both aggravated assault (-24% for the United States and  
-62% for Canada) and larcenies (-23% for the United States and -39% for 
Canada), the crime drop was greater in Canada.188 
The interesting thing about Figures 4 and 5 and Table 1 is that 
Canadian property and violent crime rates fell at about the same time and 
level of magnitude and with the same duration as the rates in the United 
States, but Canada experienced a 10% decline in the number of police 
officers per 100,000 residents from 1990 to 2000.189  Compare the 1980-
2000 property and violent crime rates for Canada in Figure 4 and the 
homicide rate in Figure 5 with the trend in police per 100,000 residents 
reported in Figure 6.  Crime was declining in Canada at a time when the 
number of police officers per capita was also declining, unlike the case for 
the United States.  It is not likely that an increase in the presence of the 
police in the United States had a spill-over effect on Canadian crime rates.  
Other more general but not yet identified or understood factors must have 
been operating.190  These data undermine any bold assertion that the great 
crime decline in the United States was unequivocally due to the deterrence 
provided by more police.  While it is likely true that crime came down in the 
United States due to more police, it really is not clear at all the extent of 
police’s role in deterrence.  What we are left with, then, is that clearly 
police presence deters crime, but it is probably very difficult to say with any 
degree of precision how much it deters.  Let us take Levitt’s estimate as a 
reasonable guess that increasing the size of the police force by 10% will 
reduce crime by about 4% or 5%.191 
 
187 Zimring, supra note 129, at 16 tbl 1.3. 
188 BEATTIE & MOLE, supra note 186, at 108 fig.5.1. 
189 Id. at 15. 
190 ZIMRING, supra note 129, at 131-32. 
191 Levitt, supra note 132, at 177. 
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Figure 6 
Police per 100,000 population in Canada, 1980-2000 
 
   
 
Source:  Beattie and Mole, 2007. 
B. THE ROLE OF IMPRISONMENT IN DETERRENCE 
One of the most substantial punishments that the criminal justice 
system has in its arsenal of sanctions is imprisonment.  Going to prison is a 
costly and painful possible outcome of committing crime.  If the deterrence 
doctrine is true, there should be an inverse relationship between the use of 
imprisonment and crime.  For example, the economist Steven Levitt 
conducted a very clever and convincing study of the relationship between 
imprisonment and crime rates.192  He was fully aware of the problem of 
simultaneity between imprisonment and crime rates (they can mutually 
affect each other) and so used prison overcrowding legislation in a state 
(court orders to reduce overcrowding) to act as an instrumental variable for 
changes in the probability of imprisonment.  Court orders to reduce 
overcrowding in some state prison systems led to a substantial reduction in 
the number of inmates and thus a decline in the probability of a convicted 
offender going to prison.193
 
192 Steven D. Levitt, The Effect of Prison Population Size on Crime Rates: Evidence from 
Prison Overcrowding Litigation, 111 Q. J. ECON. 319 (1996). 
  Using data that covered the years 1971-1993, 
Levitt concluded that likelihood of imprisonment had a non-trivial crime 
reduction effect.  He estimated that each additional man-year of 
193 Id. at 330-44, 348. 
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imprisonment resulted in the reduction of fifteen index crimes.194  It is not 
entirely clear from Levitt’s analysis, however, how much of the crime 
avoided was due to deterrence and how much to incapacitation—the fact 
that high-rate offenders get locked up and cannot commit crimes.  Other 
estimates of the effect of prison on crime come from Spelman, who argued 
that the “elasticity” of crime with respect to incarceration is between -0.2 
and -0.4.195  “Elasticity” is a statistical way of expressing the effect of a 
change in one factor on the change in another.  An elasticity of -0.2 
indicates that a 10% increase in incarceration would result in a 2% decline 
in crime.196
We can also study the relationship between changes in the rate of 
incarceration and crime rates over time to give us some sense as to whether 
imprisonment acts as a deterrent to crime.  Recall that from the early 1990s 
until the present day the crime rate in the United States dramatically 
declined.  The rate of imprisonment during this same period also increased 
rather dramatically, by some 52%.  Figure 7 shows the index violent crime 
and homicide rates in the United States from 1980 to 2008 along with the 
rate of incarceration.  It shows that the decline in serious crime and the most 




A great deal of scholarly interest has been directed at trying to 
understand the relationship between the great crime drop and the increased 
use of imprisonment.  There are excellent summaries of this literature 
available,
  One can look at this figure and be led easily to think that 
perhaps some part of the great crime drop was due to the increase in 
incarceration. 
198 and I am again selective here.  There is a general consensus 
that the decline in crime is, at least in part, due to more and longer prison 
sentences, with most of the controversy being over how much of an effect 
imprisonment had.  After an extensive empirical analysis, Spelman 
concluded that between 4% and 21% of the crime drop could be attributed 
to the expansion of incarceration.199
 
194 Id. at 345-46. 
  Levitt concluded that the increase in 
 
195 William Spelman, What Recent Studies Do (and Don’t) Tell Us About Imprisonment 
and Crime, 27 CRIME & JUST. 419, 485 (2000).  
196 Id. 
197 BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORTED CRIME IN UNITED 
STATES-TOTAL, http://bjsdata.ojp.usdoj.gov/dataonline/Search/Crime/State/statebystaterun 
.cfm?stateid=52 (last visited July 9, 2010) (crime data); BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. 
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, TOTAL CORRECTIONAL POPULATION, http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/ 
index.cfm?ty=tp&tid=11 (last visited July 9, 2010) (incarceration data). 
198 See generally BLUMSTEIN & WALLMAN, supra note 128. 
199 Spelman, supra note 195, at 109. 
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Figure 7 
Rate of Incarceration, Violent Crime, and Homicide in the United States 1980-2008 
Source:  Uniform Crime Reports, 2008. Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2010. 
 
the use of imprisonment from 1990 to 2000 was responsible for about one-
third of the declining crime rate.200
In other words, both authors would agree that some part of the decline 
in crime since the 1990s was due to the increased use of incarceration in the 
United States, and that we can attribute anywhere from 20% to 30% of the 
crime drop to imprisonment.  As was the case with the role of police 
presence in reducing crime, however, I would suggest some caution and 
humility in accepting these conclusions.  First, it is probably very safe to 
say that the threat of imprisonment does indeed act as a general deterrent 
and probably is responsible for some share of the recent crime drop.  I say 
probably and some share because, as with the role of more police, it is 
really difficult to make any more definitive conclusions about the deterrent 
effect of imprisonment for four reasons. 
   
First, the evidence to date is consistent with the fact that putting more 
people in prison can, to some degree, lower the crime rate, but it is not clear 
 
200 Levitt, supra note 132, at 178-79. 
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how this crime reduction occurs.  Putting more people behind bars can 
reduce crime by deterring them but also by incapacitating high-rate 
offenders.  While it may be true that increased imprisonment does lower 
crime, it is far more difficult to say with any authority how much of that 
crime reduction is due to deterrence and how much to incapacitation.  For 
policy purposes, I readily admit that it probably does not make much 
difference why crime goes down in response to greater incarceration, but if 
one is trying to determine the causal mechanisms behind the decline it 
certainly does.  Further, one could argue that since both the probability of 
imprisonment and the length of imprisonment increased since the 1990s, 
both deterrence and incapacitation are equally compelling explanations.201
Second, any explanation that the crime drop of the 1990s should be 
attributed to the increased use of incarceration certainly would have to 
explain how that is compatible with the earlier time trend for incarceration 
and crime shown in Figure 6.  In the decade from the early 1980s to the 
early 1990s, the rate of violent crime was rising while the incarceration rate 
was doubling.  If a greater reliance on incarceration reduces crime by 
deterrence (or even incapacitation), why did it take so long to have any 
effect on the crime rate? 
 
Third, one also needs to explain why if imprisonment was responsible 
for lowering the crime rate in the United States from 1990 to 2000, Canada 
had an almost equally impressive decline in crime without a huge expansion 
of incarceration like that in the United States?  The rate of incarceration in 
Canada declined by about 10% from 1993 to 2001, at about the same time 
that U.S. rates were doubling, and both countries experienced a substantial 
reduction in crime.202
Fourth, before one can unambiguously conclude that the policies of the 
criminal justice system, such as increased incarceration (and increased 
police presence), lowered the crime rate through deterrence, one has to be 
confident that another link in the deterrence process exists—that between 
the objective and perceptual properties of punishment.  For something like 
increased incarceration or increased law enforcement to have a general 
deterrent effect, would-be offenders would have to be aware of the 
heightened risk.  In the absence of a relationship between the objective and 
perceptual properties of punishment, confidence in general deterrence as the 
 
 
201 Marc Mauer, The Hidden Problem of Time Served in Prison, 74 SOC. RES. 701, 701-
02 (2007); see also Steven D. Levitt, Why Do Increased Arrest Rates Appear to Reduce 
Crime: Deterrence, Incapacitation, or Measurement Error?, 36 ECON. INQUIRY 353 (1998).  
202 SARA JOHNSON, CANADIAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE STATISTICS, ADULT CORRECTIONAL 
SERVICES IN CANADA (2004), available at http://dsp-psd.communication.gc.ca/ 
Pilot/Statcan/85-002-XIE/0100485-002-XIE.pdf. 
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main causal mechanism responsible for driving down the crime rate would 
be shaken.  It is to this connection that I turn next. 
V. THE LINK BETWEEN THE OBJECTIVE AND PERCEPTUAL  
PROPERTIES OF PUNISHMENT 
If criminal justice practices, such as enhanced police activity in 
particular areas or the increased use of incarceration, have a general 
deterrent effect on criminal activity, it must be because there is a causal link 
between the objective and perceptual properties of punishment.  As Ball 
wrote in his paper that appeared in the Journal, the “deterrent effect of a 
law obviously depends upon the individual’s knowledge of the law and the 
punishment prescribed.”203  An important component of the deterrence 
doctrine, and the criminal justice system itself, is that persons are aware of 
actual punishment practices and are aware of changes in those practices 
when they occur.  This does not mean that the correlation must be unity, but 
certainly one should expect to see at least a robust correlation between the 
objective and perceptual properties of punishment.  Phillip Cook similarly 
argued that although the public’s perceptions of sanction threats “are not 
accurate, [they] do tend to be systematically related to criminal justice 
system activities.”204
The expected robust correlation between the objective and perceptual 
properties of punishment, and the updating of perceptions in response to 
new information about risks and magnitudes of punishments, would seem to 
be core assertions at the heart of deterrence theory.  There is evidence that 
would-be offenders are not completely unmindful of the objective risks and 
costs they run if they commit crimes, but the correlations are rather meager 
and must be disappointing to believers in deterrence.  In fact, one of the 
“dirty little secrets” of deterrence is that there really is not much evidence in 
  Interestingly, if the correlation is moderate to large, 
then aggregate-level studies that relate the objective properties of 
punishment to crime rates do provide valid insight into the deterrence 
process, but perceptual studies about deterrence were initiated in part 
because of skepticism about this causal link.  One would also expect that 
one’s perceptions of punishment are not immutable but change in response 
to changes in objective conditions and changes in that person’s experiences.  
In other words, while a person’s current perceptions are certainly related to 
some prior set of perceptions, they are nonetheless updated in response to 
new information if persons behave rationally.   
 
203 Ball, supra note 65, at 351. 
204 Phillip Cook, Research in Criminal Deterrence: Laying the Groundwork for the 
Second Decade, in 2 CRIME & JUSTICE: AN ANNUAL REVIEW OF RESEARCH 211, 222 (Norval 
Morris & Michael Tonry eds., 1980).  
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support of a strong correlation between the objective and subjective 
properties of punishment.  Perhaps the more unfortunate fact is that 
although this may be one of the most crucial links in the deterrence process, 
it is the one that we know the least about. 
What evidence do we have about how would-be offenders perceive 
legal sanctions?  Two early studies conducted in California lead to the 
conclusion that the public does not know very much about the maximum 
and minimum punishments provided by law for different offenses, nor is 
the public very aware of any changes to those punishments, and inmates of 
California prisons were only slightly more informed.205  Anderson also 
found that convicted felons who had been imprisoned were unmindful of 
the possible consequences: 18% reported that they no idea what the penalty 
would be for their criminal act, and another 35% stated that they didn’t even 
consider the possible penalty before committing the crime that got them 
into prison.206  Many ethnographic accounts of offenders also suggest that 
in deciding whether or not to commit a crime, the probability of getting 
caught and the severity of punishment are not well known.207 
Another thing researchers have discovered is that offenders do not see 
increments in punishment in the same way that they are intended to see 
them.  Because people have what economists call subjective discount rates 
(a point that is returned to at the conclusion of this Article), they reduce in 
their minds the cost of things that are more distant in time (much like we do 
when we reduce the “pain” of buying something by using a credit card 
rather than cash).  To demonstrate this, Kent A. McClelland and Geoffrey 
P. Alpert asked a sample of 152 recently arrested persons to provide 
estimates for several different types and levels of legal punishments.208  
Consistent with subjective discounting, they found that a five-year prison 
sentence was rated to be only twice as severe as a one year sentence, and a 
twenty-year sentence was judged to be just a little more than one-half times 
 
205 See CAL. ASSEMBLY COMM. ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, DETERRENT EFFECTS OF 
CRIMINAL SANCTIONS (1968); Zimring & Hawkins, supra note 81, at 143. 
206 David A. Anderson, The Deterrence Hypothesis and Picking Pockets at the 
Pickpocket’s Hanging, 4 AM L. & ECON. REV 295, 305 (2002). 
207 See NEAL SHOVER, GREAT PRETENDERS: PURSUITS AND CAREERS OF 
PERSISTENT THIEVES 151-74 (1996); KENNETH D. TUNNELL, CHOOSING CRIME: THE 
CRIMINAL CALCULUS OF PROPERTY OFFENDERS 60-85 (1992); RICHARD T. WRIGHT 
& SCOTT H. DECKER, BURGLARS ON THE JOB: STREETLIFE AND RESIDENTIAL 
BREAK-INS 127-33 (1994); RICHARD T. WRIGHT & SCOTT H. DECKER, ARMED 
ROBBERS IN ACTION: STICKUPS AND STREET CULTURE 59-60 (1997). 
208 Kent A. McClelland & Geoffrey P. Alpert, Factor Analysis Applied to Magnitude 
Estimates of Punishment Seriousness: Patterns of Individual Differences, 1 J. QUANTITATIVE 
CRIMINOLOGY 307, 309-10 (1985). 
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more severe than a ten-year sentence.209  In a later study, Eleni Apospori 
and Alpert reported that a sample of arrested offenders perceived a ten-year 
prison sentence as only four times more severe than a one-year sentence, a 
twenty-year sentence only six times more severe, and a twenty-year 
sentence was judged to be less than one and one-half times more severe 
than a ten-year sentence.210
There is other evidence to suggest that would-be offenders’ 
perceptions of the certainty and severity of punishment are not strongly 
related to the objective properties of punishment and are, therefore, not 
likely to be very accurate nor responsive to policy changes.  Irving Piliavin 
and colleagues found that a measure of the perceived risk of formal 
punishment was unrelated to a respondent’s prior arrests and convictions.
 
211  
Julie Horney and Ineke Haen Marshall found that the total number of 
arrests an individual had accumulated and whether a person had been 
arrested for every criminal offense he or she had committed were unrelated 
to perceptions of the certainty of arrest.212
Most damaging of all to deterrence theory is a study by Gary Kleck 
and colleagues.
   
213  They interviewed 1,500 adult residents of fifty-four 
large urban counties and asked them about their perceptions of the certainty, 
severity, and celerity of punishment in their county.214  An example of a 
question about the perceived certainty of punishment measure was: “In the 
past 10 years in your county, out of every 100 robberies known to the 
police, about how many do you think resulted in the arrest of the 
robber?”215  One measure of perceived severity was: “Out of every 100 
persons convicted of robbery in your county, about how many do you think 
are given a jail or prison sentence?”216  For the celerity of punishment: “For 
persons convicted of robbery, what do you think is the average amount of 
time that passes between the day the offender is arrested and the day they 
were sentenced in court?”217
 
209 Id. at 311-14. 
  Comparable county-level measures of the 
210 See Eleni Apospori & Geoffrey Alpert, Research Note, The Role of Differential 
Experience with the Criminal Justice System for Changes in Perceptions of Severity of Legal 
Sanctions over Time, 39 CRIME & DELINQ. 184, 189 (1993). 
211 Irving Piliavin et al., Crime, Deterrence, and Rational Choice, 51 AM. SOC. REV. 101, 
114 (1986).  
212 Julie Horney & Ineke Haen Marshall, Risk Perceptions Among Serious Offenders: 
The Role of Crime and Punishment, 30 CRIMINOLOGY 575, 586 (1992). 
213 Gary Kleck et al., The Missing Link in General Deterrence Research, 43 
CRIMINOLOGY 623 (2005). 
214 Id. at 635-36. 
215 Id. at 634. 
216 Id. 
217 Id. at 635. 
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objective levels of the certainty, severity, and celerity of punishment in the 
county were obtained from the Bureau of Justice Statistics and Uniform 
Crime Reports.218  The important question that Kleck and colleagues asked 
was whether persons had higher perceptions of the certainty, severity, and 
celerity of punishment in counties where the actual levels were higher.  
They did not.  The correlations between perceived and actual punishment 
levels were consistently weak, averaging a Pearson’s correlation of 0.02, 
and none was larger than 0.13.219  At the bivariate level, less than 2% of the 
variance in perceived sanction threats was explained by actual levels of 
sanctions.220  This null finding was true when the full sample of respondents 
was stratified into those who had at least one prior arrest (the 
“experienced”) and those with no prior arrests.221  In multivariate analysis, 
county-level measures of punishment characteristics were unrelated to 
individual perceptions of sanction threats.222  This was true for each 
different measure of certainty, severity, and celerity of punishment and for 
each of four different offenses (homicide, robbery, assault, burglary) 
studied.  The variance explained in these multivariate models were all very 
small, with the largest being 0.08.223
Lance Lochner argued that a person’s perceptions about the certainty 
of arrest should depend upon “an individual’s own (past) criminal behavior 
and arrest outcomes, the criminal and arrest outcomes of others around him, 
and more general signals that may come from local arrest rates or 
neighborhood conditions.”
 
224  He examined this deterrence hypothesis with 
two different data sets—the National Youth Survey (NYS) and the National 
Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY97).225  Estimating an ordinary least 
squares regression model with the perceived probability of arrest for auto 
theft in the NLSY97 as the dependent variable, Lochner found that the 
objective certainty of punishment as measured by the country-level arrest 
rate for auto theft was unrelated to the perceived level of certainty.226  Even 
more disturbing for deterrence theory is the fact that Lochner was only able 
to explain 3% of the variance in the perceived certainty of arrest.227
 
218 Id. at 633-34 
  There 
219 Id. at 642. 
220 Id.  
221 Id. at 643 tbl.2. 
222 Id. at 645-51 tbls.3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 & 9. 
223 Id. at 647 tbl.5. 
224 Lance Lochner, Individual Perceptions of the Criminal Justice System, 97 AM. ECON. 
REV. 444, 445 (2007). 
225 Id. at 444. 
226 Id. at 450.  
227 Id. at 449 tbl.2. 
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was no measure of the local objective arrest rate in the NYS, but Lochner 
found that the perceived probability of arrest was unrelated to the 
perception that crime or disorder was a problem within one’s neighborhood.  
Like the analysis of the NLSY97 data, the amount of explained variance in 
perceptions was very small, from 4% to less than 1%.228
Horney and Marshall’s, Piliavin et al.’s, Kleck et al.’s, and Lochner’s 
studies not only show that there is not a strong relationship between 
objective sanctions and perceived sanctions; in none of these were the 
researchers able to explain much of the variance in perceived sanction 
threats.  Piliavin and colleagues explained only 7% of the variance in their 
measure of formal sanction risk.
 
229  In Horney and Marshall’s study, the 
explained variance of the perceived risk measures varied by offense but 
only ranged from 0.05 to 0.13.230  Kleck et al.’s study also varied by 
offence and only ranged between 4% and 8%.231  Lochner explained only 
3% of the variance in his model of perceived punishment.232
This inability to explain much of the variance in perceptions of 
sanction threats is another dirty little secret in deterrence research.  What 
makes this more remarkable is that in each of the studies mentioned above, 
the models are fairly well-specified with appropriate right-hand-side 
variables that theoretically should matter.  In addition, it is not as if 
predictions of future states are difficult to explain, as scholars have been 
able to better explain other kinds of perceptions, such as perceptions of 
college attendance, fertility, smoking, and mortality.
   
233  We really do not 
know very much about how perceptions of punishment are formed, and we 
are no better informed than we were when Daniel S. Nagin concluded ten 
years ago that “[t]he literature on the formation of sanction risk perception 
is small and narrow in scope.”234
 
228 Id. at 452 tbl.4 
  However, it is not only an important 
theoretical question about deterrence, but it has critical policy significance.  
If perceptions of sanction threats are not directly tied to objective practices 
229 Piliavin, supra note 211, at 111 tbl.4.  
230 Horney & Marshall, supra note 212, at 584 tbl.2. 
231 Kleck et al., supra note 213, at 647 tbl.5. 
232 Lochner, supra note 224, at 227.  The models of Matsueda et al. are also consistent 
with Horney & Marshall’s, Lochner’s, and Kleck’s in that the amount of explained variance 
of perceptions of punishment were low (ranging between 0.03 and 0.26), even with lagged 
values of the dependent variable in the model.  Ross Matsueda et al., Deterring Delinquents: 
A Rational Choice Model of Theft and Violence, 71 AM. SOC. REV. 95, 108-09 tbl.2 (2006). 
233 Wandi Bruine de Bruin et al., Can Adolescents Predict Significant Life Events?, 41 J. 
ADOLESCENT HEALTH 208 (2007); Baruch Fischhoff et al., Teen Expectations for Significant 
Life Events, 64 PUB. OPINION Q. 189 (2000); Michael Schoenbaum, The Accuracy of Teens’ 
Expectations of Future Smoking, 28 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. 274 (2005). 
234 Nagin, supra note 77, at 17. 
2010] CRIMINAL DETERRENCE 809 
in the criminal justice system, then they will not be responsive to or easily 
manipulated by criminal justice policy. 
We do not know very much about how perceptions are formed, but, in 
a bit of good news for deterrence theory, we do know that once formed 
perceptions are modified by experiences, both one’s own experiences and 
the experiences of others.  This is good news for deterrence theory because 
people have shown themselves to be capable Bayesians.  Prior perceptions 
of the risk of punishment are generally modified downward when people 
commit crimes and get away with it—this has been called the “experiential 
effect” in the literature.235  People also generally increase their perceptions 
of the risk of punishment when they do get caught.236  Lochner also found 
that, in both the NYS and NLSY97 datasets, there was evidence of updating 
of perceptions in response to one’s own behavior—those who committed 
crimes and were not arrested had lower perceptions of the certainty of 
punishment.237  What was interesting, however, is that while there was a 
significant relationship between arrests for a serious crime and perceived 
certainty, it was insignificant when arrest for any offense was used.  This 
implies that attempts by authorities to crack down on minor crimes in “zero 
tolerance” campaigns are not likely to spill over to affect beliefs about the 
probability of arrest for more serious crimes.238
Finally, Shamena Anwar and Thomas A. Loughran estimated a 
Bayesian model of perceptual updating on the basis of one’s experience.
 
239  
An important characteristic of their research is that it was conducted with a 
high-risk sample of offenders—youth who have been convicted, either in 
juvenile or adult court, of a serious felony offense.240
 
235 Saltzman et al., supra note 
  They too found that 
the experience of an arrest increased one’s risk perceptions, although the 
magnitude of the effect was rather modest.  An individual who committed a 
crime and was arrested for it increased his or her perceptions of the 
98, at 180-84. 
236 See Horney & Marshall, supra note 212, at 584 tbl.2; Lochner, supra note 224, at 454 
tbl.5; Matsueda et al., supra note 232, at 111. 
237 Contrary evidence was found by Pogarsky and colleagues who reported that those 
who had experienced an arrest had lower perceptions of the risk of punishment compared 
with those not arrested. They analogized this to the “gambler’s fallacy” whereby once 
arrested, offenders think that they are due a streak of good luck before the next arrest. Greg 
Pogarsky & Alex R. Piquero, Can Punishment Encourage Offending? Investigating the 
‘Resetting’ Effect, 40 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 92 (2003); Greg Pogarsky et al., Modeling 
Change in Perceptions about Sanction Threats: The Neglected Linkage in Deterrence 
Theory, 20 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 343 (2004). 
238 Lochner, supra note 224, at 456 tbl.6 (presenting results for male offenders). 
239 Shamena Anwar & Thomas A. Loughran, Testing a Bayseian Learning Theory of 
Deterrence among Serious Juvenile Offenders (Apr. 1 2010) (unpublished, on file with 
author). 
240 Id. at 23. 
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certainty of punishment by only 5%, compared with those who had not been 
arrested.241  This increase in perceived risk was greater for less experienced 
offenders (for whom the information of an arrest would be more novel) than 
for the more experienced.242  Unfortunately for both a more general 
deterrent effect and for the deterrent effectiveness of “zero-tolerance” 
policing of minor offenses, the effect of an arrest was crime specific.  
Getting arrested for a violent crime did not affect one’s perceptions of the 
risk for committing a property offense.243
To summarize, contrary to the deterrence doctrine, subjective 
probabilities of punishment held by individuals do not appear to vary 
systematically with the actual or objective probabilities.  Levitt observed 
over ten years ago that “there are a number of obstacles to effective 
deterrence.  First, criminals may be poorly informed about the likelihood of 
detection.”
 
244  The research to date, though sparse, does suggest that would-
be offenders are not well-informed about the actual risks of sanctions.  Nor 
do we know very much about how perceptions are formed.  However, 
consistent with a rational actor assumption, research has shown that 
individuals’ assessments of the risk of being legally sanctioned are affected 
by their and others’ experiences with committing crimes with impunity and 
with getting arrested.  Those individuals who commit crimes and get away 
with them, and who know of others who have had the same experiences, are 
more likely to lower their estimate of the risk of crime.  Individuals who get 
arrested do update their perceptions of risk, usually by increasing the 
estimate they have about the risk of another arrest (although whether a 
gambler’s fallacy exists, and there is a resetting of one’s risk following an 
arrest, is yet to be determined).  What is troubling is that perceptions of 
sanction threats are generally not well explained at all.  We know very little 
about exactly how perceptions of punishment certainty, severity, and 
celerity are formed and this is one of the most glaring holes in the 
deterrence literature.  Further, while perceptions of sanction threats do 
increase in response to an arrest, consistent with the deterrence process, 
Anwar and Loughran’s research suggests that this effect is very modest.245
 
241 Id. at 28. 
  
The fact that perceptions of sanction threats are not strongly related to the 
actual levels of punishment does not speak well of the ability of the 
criminal justice system to regulate criminal conduct through polices aimed 
at making punishment more certain, severe, or swift. 
242 Id. at 30. 
243 Id. at 30-32. 
244 Levitt, supra note 201, at 353. 
245 Anwar & Loughran, supra note 239, at 28. 
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VI. THE LINK BETWEEN PERCEIVED SANCTION THREATS AND CRIME 
The link between perceptions of the certainty, severity, and celerity of 
punishment and self-reported involvement in crime has been extremely well 
researched, with a line of empirical studies that dates back to the early 
1970s.246  The question that this line of research attempts to address is, 
“Whatever the source of individual perceptions of sanction threats, is there 
an inverse relationship between perceptions of the certainty, severity, and 
celerity of punishment and involvement in crime?”247  The research in this 
area has gone through a number of methodological developments.  In the 
first stage, respondents were asked about their current perceptions of the 
certainty and severity of punishment for certain acts and their previous self-
reported involvement in those acts.  This line of cross-sectional survey data 
consistently revealed that those who perceived the certainty of punishment 
to be higher were less likely to report involvement in crime (the results 
were not as consistent for perceived severity).248  While these findings were 
initially taken as evidence of a deterrent effect for perceived sanction 
threats, it became clear that since the self-reported behaviors were lagged 
(usually by one year) before the perception measures, the inverse 
correlation captured not deterrence but an “experiential effect.”249  This 
experiential effect reflects the fact that those who committed crimes usually 
got away with it, and they adjusted their perceptions downward in response 
to that new information.250
 
246 See Waldo & Chiricos, supra note 
   
96, at 522-28.  There is virtually no research on the 
role of the swiftness or celerity of punishment on self-reported crime.  See Daniel S. Nagin 
& Greg Pogarsky, Integrating Celerity, Impulsivity, and Extralegal Sanction Threats into a 
Model of General Deterrence: Theory and Evidence, 39 CRIMINOLOGY 865 (2001) 
(providing a recent exception).  This is another one of the gaping holes in deterrence 
research. This may be due to the fact that it is not entirely clear which direction the 
deterrence hypothesis would predict.  Early deterrence theorists like Beccaria  clearly argued 
that punishment must be swift in order to be effective  
because when the length of time that passes between punishment and the misdeed is less, so 
much the stronger and more lasting in the human mind is the association of these two ideas, 
crime and punishment; they then come insensibly to be considered, one as the cause, the other as 
the necessary inevitable effect.  
BECCARIA, supra note 2, at 56 (emphasis omitted).  Empirical work by Loewenstein 
however, questions this. George Loewenstein, Anticipation and the Valuation of Delayed 
Consumption, 97 ECON. J. 666 (1987).  Findings from some of his experiments suggest that, 
given the choice, people would like to get their punishment over as quickly as possible and 
that punishment delayed is seen as more costly than if given immediately.  Id. at 667-69. 
247 See Waldo & Chicoros, supra note 96, at 525-27. 
248 For a review, see Paternoster, supra note 77. 
249 Saltzman et. al., supra note 233, at 180-84 
250 Id. 
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The second stage adopted a similar survey methodology but utilized 
panel data so that perceived sanction threats were measured before the 
incidence of offending—now perceptions were generally lagged by one 
year.  These studies too showed inverse relationships between perceptions 
of certainty and crime (but not generally severity), but they were much 
reduced in magnitude from those found in cross-sectional research.251  
Moreover, multivariate models consistently indicated that informal 
sanctions were more responsible for inhibiting criminal conduct than the 
fear of formal sanctions.  Nevertheless, panel survey data did provide some 
support for the deterrence doctrine at least with respect to the perceived 
certainty of punishment.252
Three recent examples of the use of survey data to study deterrent 
effects on behavior by Ross Matsueda et al., Lochner, and Loughran et al. 
are especially informative.  Matsueda and colleagues examined the 
relationship between the perceived certainty of arrest and subsequent 
delinquency using panel data from the Denver Youth Study.
 
253  Consistent 
with deterrence theory, they found that net of other known explanatory 
factors, those youth who believed they would be arrested for committing 
crime were less likely to report doing it in the subsequent year.254  This 
deterrent effect held for both self-reported violent crimes and theft.255  
Consistent with a more general model, they also found that the perceived 
benefits of criminal offending comprised an important factor, and the 
estimated effect for the perceived costs and benefits of offending were of 
roughly the same magnitude.256
[G]iven that the United States has one of the highest arrest and imprisonment rates 
among Western nations, increasing the perceived probability of arrest by 0.1 would 
likely involve draconian steps by the criminal justice system.  This implies that 
policies for increasing the objective probability of punishment, by themselves, may be 
of limited value for reducing the crime rate substantially . . . .  Indeed, the modest 
explained variance in your models of theft (seven percent) and violence (nine percent) 
  Although they found evidence of deterrent 
effects, Matsueda and colleagues were careful in noting that the deterrence 
factors were not the most important determinants of crime and that the 
modest effects on crime reduction would suggest caution in using the 
criminal justice system as the primary tool for compliance: 
 
251 For reviews, see Nagin, supra note 234, at 12-16; Paternoster, supra note 248, at 185 
tbl.3; Travis Pratt et al., The Empirical Status of Deterrence Theory: A Meta-Analysis, in 
TAKING STOCK: THE STATUS OF CRIMINOLOGICAL THEORY 367, 383 (Francis T. Cullen et al. 
eds., 2006). 
252 See Paternoster, supra note 77, at 191-94 
253 Matsueda et al., supra note 232, at 103. 
254 Id. at 114-15 tbl.3. 
255 Id. 
256 Id. 
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suggests that other processes, such as socialization and embeddedness in institutions, 
may dwarf the effects of punishment and suggest more efficient policy 
interventions.257
Lochner examined deterrent effects in two different data sets, the 
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY97) and the National Youth 
Survey (NYS), both nationally representative panel data sets.
 
258  Using an 
estimate of the perceived probability of arrest for auto theft in the NLSY97, 
Lochner found that it was inversely and significantly related to self-reported 
subsequent involvement in auto theft and theft of something worth more 
than $50.259  The effect was not large; a 10% increase in the perceived 
probability of arrest was estimated to reduce auto theft by 7% and serious 
theft by only 4%.260  Matsueda cautions that it might take draconian 
criminal justice policies to increase the perceived probability of punishment 
appreciably.  This and the fact that Lochner found that the arrest rate in the 
area was unrelated to the individual’s perceptions of the probability of 
arrest further limit the public policy implications of these findings.  In 
addition, recall that in Lochner’s research one measure of the objective 
certainty of punishment, the county-level arrest rate, had no deterrent effect 
on self-reported auto theft or serious property theft.261  In the analysis of 
NYS data, Lochner estimated the relationship between crime-specific 
perceptions about the probability of arrest for two types of theft, breaking 
and entering, and attacking someone, on one hand, and self-reported 
subsequent involvement in those acts, on the other.262  All coefficients were 
negative, as predicted by deterrence theory, and Lochner estimated that an 
increase of ten percentage points in the perceived probability of punishment 
reduced involvement in serious thefts by about 3% and auto theft by 
about 8%.263
Loughran and colleagues investigated the functional form of the 
deterrence model using data from a sample of juvenile offenders who were 




257 Id. at 117. 
  
Respondents were asked how likely is it that they would be caught and 
arrested for the following crimes: fighting, robbery with gun, stabbing 
someone, breaking into a store or home, stealing clothes from a store, 
258 Lochner, supra note 224, at 444. 
259 Id. at 457. 
260 Id. at 458. 
261 Id. at 454 tbl.5. 
262 Id. at 457-58. 
263 Id. at 458. 
264 Loughran et al., supra note 98. 
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vandalism, and auto theft.265  They were also asked to self-report the 
frequency of their involvement in seventeen different delinquent/criminal 
offenses that reflected the offenses in the perceptions questions.266  
Summary scales were created both for the perceived risk of arrest and for 
self-reported offending.  They found evidence of a non-linear, inverse 
relationship between the risk of arrest and offending.267  Perceptions about 
the risk of arrest had no effect on self-reported offending when the 
estimated risk was below some tipping point (an estimated probability of 
arrest of 0.30).268  In addition, there was a point of diminishing deterrence 
returns at the upper end of the perceived risk of arrest distribution.  When 
the perceived probability of arrest was within the range from 0.30 to 0.70, a 
10% increase of perceived risk was associated with a statistically significant 
decrease of more than one half of an offense on average.269  However, when 
the perceived probability of arrest was over 0.70, a 10% increase of 
perceived risk was associated with a much smaller decrease of only about 
0.159 of an offense on average.270  Taken together, these results suggest that 
the marginal deterrent effect of a change in certainty is substantially 
greater—that is, nearly 3.5 times larger—for individuals in the mid-range of 
the continuum, as compared to those in the upper ranges.271
In the third stage of perceptual deterrence research, researchers 
recognized that perceptions of sanction threats should optimally be 
measured at the time that would-be offenders are contemplating committing 
a crime.
  Two important 
implications of this are that the observed deterrent effects are very modest 
in magnitude, and while sanction threat certainty must be above a certain 




265 Id. at 13. 
  This recognition led to the development of so-called scenario 
studies.  In this type of research, respondents are provided with a 
description of the commission of a crime that is as realistic as possible.  For 
example, the respondent may be asked to imagine himself in a bar and to 
believe that he has had enough alcohol to put himself above the legal limit.  
He is told that he could either drive home himself (and thus drive while 
266 Id. at 14. 
267 Id. at 16-18. 
268 Id. at 18. 
269 Id. at 20. 
270 Id. at 21. 
271 Id. 
272 In addition, if perceptions are not stable over time, then the longer the lag between the 
measurement of perceptions and behavior the greater the possibility of measurement error 
which would bias any observed relationship to zero. 
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drunk) or get a ride with someone but then be forced to get back to the bar 
the next morning the get their car.  The respondent typically would then be 
asked to estimate the risk of being caught for drunk driving if he was to 
drive himself home, estimate the severity of the punishment he would 
receive if he was caught, and then estimate the probability that he would 
drive home in the described situation.  The findings from these scenario 
studies consistently show support for deterrence theory, at least with respect 
to the perceived certainty of punishment.  Those who think they are likely 
to get caught are less likely to evade paying their taxes, drive while drunk, 
steal things, cheat in school, act in a sexually aggressive manner, act 
violently, or engage in various acts of corporate crime.273
A study by Nagin and Pogarsky is deserving of special scrutiny 
because it presents one of the most theoretically sophisticated deterrence 
models in the literature and it combines the elements of perceived certainty, 
severity, and celerity.
 
274  Nagin and Pogarsky argue that crime will be 
committed when the expected benefits outweigh the expected costs:275
U(Benefits) > p U(Legal Costs + Extralegal Costs) (2.1) 
 
Here, the extralegal costs include such things as social censure and self-
inflicted guilt, and p is the perceived risk of being sanctioned.  This is the 
traditional deterrence model in which crime is expected to be reduced when 
either the probability of punishment, p, or the perceived severity of legal 
punishment (arrest) increases, modified by the inclusion of a parameter that 
captures the conceptual spirit of the celerity of punishment.  For example, it 
is not clear that netting $500 immediately from a theft is exactly offset by 
the probability of a $500 fine at sometime in the future.  Traditional theory 
holds that only if the cost is expected to arrive quickly after the act—
theoretically as quickly as the benefit—is there an offset.  Delay makes the 
severity of the punishment diminish because it is not immediate and not as 
severe.  If would-be offenders would prefer to delay their punishment, we 
should expect to see a celerity effect.276
 
273 See Nagin, supra note 
 
77, for a review. 
274 Nagin & Pogarsky, supra note 246. 
275 Id. at 872. 
276 There is no theoretical reason why this has to be true, and Loewenstein has 
empirically found evidence for the counter position that persons would prefer to get their 
punishment over quickly rather than have it delayed.  Loewenstein, supra note 246, at 667-
68.  The idea that punishment which is to be delivered later is actually perceived to be more 
painful is consistent with the concept of “dread.”  Id. at 667.  The notion of dread makes 
things conceptually messy for deterrence theory because while there is an empirical basis for 
thinking that gains are discounted in the future, we have no knowledge as to whether or not 
this is symmetric with respect to losses. 
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In response to this, Nagin and Pogarsky add another parameter to 
equation 2 above, δ, which is a discount factor that assigns a weight to 
future costs.277
U(Benefits) > δ
  The model becomes: 
t
Here, the expected legal and extralegal costs of offending are scaled by δ
 p U(Legal Costs + Extralegal Costs) (2.2) 
t 
and by r, where δt=1/(1 + r).  The extent to which costs are scaled depends 
upon how many time periods the legal and extralegal sanctions are delayed, 
which is the celerity of punishment, and r, which is the individual’s 
discount rate.  The discount rate is the extent to which the person reduces 
the value of future objects; those with a high discount rate are more 
impulsive and less patient (Cook has argued that individual discount rates 
may make deterrence through the legal system problematic).278  Notice 
what happens to the costs of crime when the discount rate increases from 
0.10 to 0.20 (and the delay is equal to one time period).  When r=0.10, the 
discount factor is equal to 0.91.  As Nagin and Pogarsky illustrate, when the 
present value of a fine is $1,000, the value delayed by one time period falls 
to $909 with a discount fact of 0.91.279
According to this deterrence model, the utility of crime decreases as 
legal and extralegal costs increase.  The utility of crime also decreases as 
the probability of punishment, captured by p, increases.  The magnitude by 
which punishment produces a disutility is also a function of the value of the 
discount factor δ
  When the discount rate is increased 
from 0.10 to 0.20, the discount factor becomes 0.83 and the value of a 
$1,000 fine for a more impulsive individual is $833.  They also show how 
the discount factor provides an operational understanding of the celerity of 
punishment.  At a fixed level of impulsivity (r), the longer the expected 
delay in punishment (or, as t increases) the discount factor also increases.  
So if r=0.10 and the delay in punishment is over two periods, then the 
discount factor is 0.83 and the present value of a $1,000 fine is $833. 
t for each individual—as it decreases the person places less 
weight on the cost of future punishment.  As can be seen, the value of δt 
Although Nagin and Pogarsky did not directly confront this issue, 
notice that if George Loewenstein is correct, persons do not view delayed 
punishment more favorably but want to get their punishment over as 
quickly as possible.
declines as t, the time between the act (or celerity), increases. 
280
 
277 Nagin & Pogarsky, supra note 
  If true, then celerity would have an inverse weight, 
such that delayed punishment is perceived to be more costly than more 
immediate punishment.  Whether or not celerity is a positive or negative 
246, at 872. 
278 Cook, supra note 204, at 232-33. 
279 Nagin & Pogarsky, supra note 246, at 872. 
280 Loewenstein, supra note 246, at 667-68. 
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weight is one of the interesting issues deterrence researchers need to 
address in the future. 
Nagin and Pogarsky collected data using a hypothetical drunk driving 
scenario and a sample of college students to test their deterrence model.281
As well as being one of the most interesting and informative 
perceptual deterrence studies, Nagin and Pogarsky’s findings summarize 
this entire body of perceptual deterrence literature.
  
They found that the perceived certainty and severity of legal punishment 
had a significant effect on expressed intentions to drive while drunk, but the 
perceived celerity of punishment did not.  As in virtually every deterrence 
study to date, the perceived certainty of punishment was more important 
than the perceived severity.  The perceived extralegal costs of punishment 
(the cost of hiring a lawyer) was at least as good at explaining intentions to 
drive drunk as the anticipated fines.  The effect of the perceived severity 
was far less for those who were more present-oriented than those who were 
more future-oriented.  Nagin and Pogarsky’s work is important, not only for 
putting celerity back on the table for deterrence scholars to debate and 
examine, but for getting deterrence theorists to think about the role of stable 
individual characteristics, such as one’s discount rate or time orientation, in 
the deterrence process. 
282  As seen across a 
diverse variety of offenses and with different methodologies (panel survey 
and scenarios), the evidence seems to suggest that there is a modest 
deterrent effect for the perceived certainty of legal punishment on behavior, 
no consistent effect for the perceived severity or celerity of punishment 
(though the latter needs additional research), an even stronger effect for the 
certainty of non-legal or informal sanctions, and finally, a modest to strong 
effect for the perceived benefits or gains from offending.  The conclusion 
that Nagin came to in his earlier review of the deterrence literature seems 
equally accurate today: “[A] consensus has emerged among perceptual 
deterrence researchers that the negative association between sanction risk 
perceptions and offending behavior or intentions [to offend] is measuring 
deterrence.”283
 
281 Nagin & Pogarsky, supra note 
  The dispute may occur over how large the effect is.  Other 
reviewers of the perceptual deterrence and rational choice literature, for 
example, have noted that the magnitude of these observed deterrent effects 
have not been particularly large relative to other explanatory factors.  Travis 
Pratt and colleagues conducted a meta-analysis of the perceptual deterrence 
literature and concluded that “the mean effect sizes of the relationships 
between crime/deviance and variables specified by deterrence theory are 
246, at 874-75. 
282 Id. at 872-84. 
283 Nagin, supra note 77, at 15. 
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modest to negligible.”284
VII. CONCLUSION 
  The safest conclusion from the literature thus far 
would be that the perception of certain legal and extralegal sanctions does 
seem to act as a modest deterrent factor, but that the perceived severity and 
celerity of punishment do not appear to be effective deterrents to crime, and 
we know virtually nothing about celerity.  The remaining question to be 
addressed in the conclusion is why we do not find more dramatic and 
impressive deterrent effects.  Is it because people are not rational as 
deterrence theory requires, or is it that the criminal justice system is not set 
up to best exploit that rationality? 
The remark offered at the beginning of this Article still seems relevant 
at the end—the literature seems to suggest that there is a marginal deterrent 
effect to some changes in criminal justice policy.  It is reasonable to believe 
that increasing the number of police officers on the street does deter some 
amount of crime, and increasing the risk of incarceration does as well.  The 
literature on the specific deterrent effect of imprisonment (whether those 
who are punished do not return to crime when released) was not reviewed 
here, but it has been reviewed elsewhere very recently, and the evidence 
does not suggest that either imprisonment itself or the length of 
imprisonment is effective in deterring crime for those who experience it.285  
There is very little evidence to support the notion that there is a robust 
relationship between the objective and perceived properties of punishment, 
though offenders do rationally update their risk estimates in response to 
their own and others’ experiences.  Finally, while there may be 
disagreement about the magnitude, there does seem to be a modest inverse 
relationship between the perceived certainty of punishment and crime, but 
no real evidence of a deterrent effect for severity, and no real knowledge 
base about the celerity of punishment.286
 
284 Pratt et al., supra note 
   
251, at 383. 
285 See Anthony N. Doob & Cheryl Marie Webster, Sentence Severity and Crime: 
Accepting the Null Hypothesis, in 30 CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 143 
(Michael Tonry ed., 2003); Daniel S. Nagin et al., Imprisonment and Reoffending, in 38 
CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 115 (Michael Tonry ed., 2009). 
286 In addition to the work on the specific deterrent effect of imprisonment, space 
prevented the review of other literatures that speak to the possibility of a deterrent effect.  
For example, one important but unaddressed issue is whether or not there is a marginal 
deterrent effect as one transitions from the juvenile justice system to the adult system.  There 
is evidence in favor of deterrence from studies that show a sharp drop in crime when youth 
reach the age of adulthood and move from the very much more lenient juvenile justice 
system to the more punitive adult justice system.  Steven D. Levitt, Juvenile Crime and 
Punishment, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1156 (1998).  However, while Hjalmarsson found that the 
perceived risk of arrest and punishment increases at the age of majority, there was no 
consistent relationship between this increased perception of risk and self-reported 
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A puzzling question is why deterrent effects reported in the literature 
are not stronger.  Does it mean that people are not rational and do not 
behave rationally?  Or does it mean that the criminal justice system might 
not be the best place to see deterrent effects given how it the system works?  
In other words, perhaps offenders are rational, or at least rational enough to 
be effectively deterred by sanction threats, but the criminal justice system is 
not capable of exploiting that rationality.287
The evidence to date with respect to deterrence does speak clearly 
about the role of rational choice in criminal offending.  It says that while 
offenders and would-be offenders may not be perfect Bayesians or perfectly 
rational, they certainly are rational in the sense that they respond to 
incentives and disincentives.  For example, research at the individual-level 
shows that people are affected by their perceptions about the risk of getting 
caught for misconduct and that these perceptions are sensitive to the 
outcomes of behavior.  Perceptions of the risks of crime are pushed 
downward when people commit crimes and get away with them and are 
pushed upward when they get arrested.  Policy studies about the policing of 
“hot spots” and police “crackdowns” do generally show that there is at least 
an initial general deterrent effect in response to the enhanced presence of 
the police and police actions, and that offenders rationally readjust their 
perceptions of the risk of sanctions and reduce their offending.  Or 
rationally noticing that enforcement in one area has increased, they “move 
around the corner” and commit crimes elsewhere until the “heat is off.”  
Evidence of crime displacement, then, while troublesome for policy 
evaluations is perfectly consistent, and even expected, under the 
assumptions of deterrence and rational choice theory.   
 
 
involvement in criminal behavior.  Randi Hjalmarsson, Crime and Expected Punishment: 
Changes in Perception at the Age of Criminal Majority, 11 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 209, 240-
44 (2009).  There is also evidence counter to deterrence theory which fails to show that 
permissible concealed gun laws have a negative impact on crime.  Jens Ludwig, Gun Self-
Defense and Deterrence, in 27 CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 363 (Michael 
Tonry ed., 2000).  Finally, there is an abundant literature on whether or not the death penalty 
is an effective deterrent to homicide with strong statements by some that it is a very effective 
deterrent, while others offer compelling grounds to think that it really has no effect.  See 
generally Ethan Cohen-Cole et al., Model Uncertainty and the Deterrent Effect of Capital 
Punishment, 11 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 335 (2009); John J. Donahue & Justin Wolfers, 
Estimating the Impact of the Death Penalty on Murder, 11 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 249 
(2009); John J. Donahue & Justin Wolfers, Uses and Abuses of Empirical Evidence in the 
Death Penalty Debate, 58 STAN. L. REV. 791 (2005); Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, 
Is Capital Punishment Morally Required? Acts, Omissions, and Life-Life Tradeoffs, 58 
STAN. L. REV. 703 (2005).   
287 Special thanks to Shawn Bushway for hammering this point into my head as only he 
can. 
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Even the finding that prison sentences or longer prison sentences do 
not deter—and may actually slightly increase the risk of recidivism—is 
consistent with a rational choice view of offending.288  While prison, and 
more rather than less prison, may send a deterrent message to would-be 
offenders that punishment is credible and severe, it may, in the longer-term, 
make it much more difficult for those who have been imprisoned to desist 
when they leave the penitentiary.  There is an abundant literature that 
vividly describes the many and onerous obstacles to employment, housing, 
and full civic participation that ex-offenders face upon release from 
prison.289
The answer to this question must remain speculative at the moment but 
it was hinted at very early on in the intellectual history of deterrence theory 
and the intellectual history of the Journal of Criminal Law and 
Criminology.
  These obstacles have the effect of decreasing the utility of non-
offending.  Confronted by the fact that employment is substantially 
impaired because of their criminal record, public housing is restricted, and 
other penalties to citizenship exist, crime subsequent to imprisonment may 
be the more rational alternative for some past offenders.  Much of the 
deterrence literature, then, is perfectly consistent with a rational choice 
understanding of criminal behavior.  But if offenders and would-be 
offenders are indeed rational, why are deterrent effects for legal sanctions 
so meager in the literature? 
290  Both Bentham and Beccaria argued that in order to be 
effective in offsetting the perceived benefits of crime, punishment must 
come soon after the offense.  Beccaria said it most directly: “The more 
promptly and the more closely punishment follows upon the commission of 
a crime, the more just and useful it will be.”291  The reason prompt 
punishment is more “useful” is because it is important “that the crime and 
the punishment be intimately linked to together, if it be desirable that, in 
crude vulgar minds, the seductive picture of a particularly advantageous 
crime should immediately call up the associated idea of punishment.”292
Although both Beccaria and Bentham have been accused of having had 
a primitive idea of human learning, they actually had a quite sophisticated 
   
 
288 Cf. Doob & Webster, supra note 285. 
289 See generally DEVAH PAGER, MARKED: RACE, CRIME, AND FINDING WORK IN AN ERA 
OF MASS INCARCERATION (2007); Shawn D. Bushway, The Impact of Arrest on the Job 
Stability of Young White American Men, 35 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 454 (1998); Shawn D. 
Bushway, Labor Market Effect of Permitting Employers Access to Criminal History 
Records, 20 J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 276 (2004); Christopher Uggen et al., Citizenship and 
Reintegration: The Socioeconomic, Familial, and Civic Lives of Criminal Offenders, 605 
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 281 (2006).  
290 See, e.g., von Hentig, supra note 43. 
291 BECCARIA, supra note 2, at 55. 
292 Id. at 57. 
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understanding of the limits of criminal deterrence.  Beccaria clearly argued 
that for a deterrence system to be most effective, the crime should 
immediately trigger in the would-be offender’s mind the anticipated 
punishment.  The benefit of the crime, the “seductive picture” of it, is 
immediate and must in turn be countered in the person’s mind by the 
comparably immediate anticipation of punishment.  Beccaria was fully 
aware of the pull of immediate pleasure and that most of us are more 
attracted by the immediate benefits of action than we are by the long-term 
costs: “[T]he more vulgar [people] are, the more apt they are to act merely 
on immediate and familiar associations, ignoring the more remote and 
complex ones.”293
Criminal deterrence may have its limits precisely because the legal 
costs are far removed in time and people find it difficult to feel the pain of 
the longer-term consequences of their actions.  The critic of deterrence von 
Hentig referred to the pains of the criminal law as a “long-distance danger” 
and noted that “the criminal seems to be in part a human specimen, whose 
appetites and desires are irresistibly attracted by a near object.”
  For deterrence to work well, the would-be offender, 
tempted by the immediate gains of committing the crime, must be able to 
quickly conjure up in her mind the anticipated pain of punishment.  To 
assist them in that conjuring up of the punishment in their mind, the 
criminal justice system must make punishment swift.  However, in the 
criminal justice system, not only are punishments uncertain, they are far in 
the future compared with the benefits of offending.  The criminal justice 
system, because it has other imperatives (justice must be served and justice 
frequently takes time), is not culturally positioned to exploit the rationality 
of offenders. 
294  The 
problem of being seduced by “near objects” is perhaps more general than 
von Hentig thought.  Think for a moment of the predicament of the dieter 
tempted by a delicious slice of chocolate cake.  The pleasures are powerful 
and immediate, and the pain of added pounds is down the road, removed in 
time.  The cake would be eaten unless this dieter can imagine in their mind 
an immediate cost—say the feeling of defeat at breaking her diet or shame 
at succumbing to the seduction.  In order to offset the immediate pleasure of 
eating the chocolate cake, the tempted dieter would have to be able to 
perceive an immediate pain of breaking the diet.  In a series of absolutely 
fascinating research papers, a group of behavioral economists and 
psychologists referred to this immediate discomfort or pain as the “pain of 
paying.”295
 
293 Id. at 56. 
  They specifically ask why people purchase things they clearly 
294 Von Hentig, supra note 43, at 559 (emphasis omitted). 
295 Brian Kuntson et al., Neural Predictors of Purchases, 53 NEURON 147, 147 (2007); 
Scott Rick et al., Tightwads and Spendthrifts, 34 J. CONSUMER RES. 767, 768 (2007).  
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cannot afford, sometimes becoming spendthrifts; the answer, they argue, is 
that many of us find it difficult to feel the “pain of paying,” we defer 
payment with credit cards or don’t really pay for it by using debit cards.296  
Unable to feel the immediate pain of paying, we buy what we don’t need to 
buy, we eat and drink what we shouldn’t eat and drink, and we gamble 
when we should save.  The “limit[] of deterrence” is that formal legal 
sanctions may be too far removed in time to provide that immediate pain of 
paying.297  This was precisely the point made by Jeffery in his Journal 
article when he noted that a most unfortunate feature about legal 
punishment and criminal behavior, and the reason why criminal sanctions 
cannot be relied upon to generate conformity, is that “[t]here are no 
aversive stimuli in the environment at that moment.”298
Without suggesting at all that legal sanctions should be abandoned 
because Andenaes was absolutely correct when he asserted that legal 
sanctions serve to reinforce our notion of morality, and because there is 
evidence of modest marginal deterrent effects of the law, we might take 
Beccaria’s advice in the next to the last chapter of On Crimes to heart and 
consider that our best effort at securing compliance with rules may come 
much earlier in life through education and prevention.
 
299
Finally, it is also very likely that the distal punishment of the criminal 
justice system not only fails to constructively exploit rationality, it does, to 
its detriment, effectively exploit a common feature of decision making 
under uncertainty—time discounting.  As Cook brought up three decades 
ago, people have a tendency to “discount” future events.
  Maybe Beccaria 
had it right and the answer to America’s crime problem is to be found in the 
Emile and not the Panopticon. 
300  This 
discounting would account for the fact that even those who have 
experienced punishment, on average, rate a ten-year prison sentence as 
much less than twice as severe as a five-year sentence.301
 
296 Knutson et al., supra note 
  When we think 
we are greatly enhancing deterrent effects by doubling the length of 
sentences, then, we likely have a far lessened impact on the offending 
calculus of offenders.  Time discounting applies to the entire panoply of 
sanctions available in the arsenal of the legal system, punishments occur in 
the future, and their certainty and severity may be greatly discounted in 
making a decision as to whether to commit a crime or not.  Whatever 
sanctions the criminal justice system may have available for offenders or 
295, at 151-52; Rick et al., supra note 295, at 767-69. 
297 Von Hentig, supra note 43, at 559. 
298 Jeffery, supra note 71, at 299 (emphasis added). 
299 BECCARIA, supra note 2, at 93-98. 
300 Cook, supra note 204, at 232-33. 
301 McClelland & Alpert, supra note 208, 311 tbl.1. 
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would-be offenders, their effectiveness in deterring crime is naturally 
diminished by their lack of temporal proximity to the offending decision.  
This lends further humility in expecting that the law and legal institutions 
can play the most important role in securing compliance to important social 
norms. 
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